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Oy Canada! Trade’s Non-solution to “the
Problem” of U.S. Drug Prices
Daniel Gilman†

HORSTMAN: Mr. President, why did you block the reimportation of
safer and inexpensive drugs from Canada which would have cut 40 to
60 percent off of the cost?
BUSH: I haven’t yet. Just want to make sure they’re safe. When a
drug comes in from Canada, I want to make sure it cures you and
doesn’t kill you.
KERRY: John, you heard the president just say that he thought he
might try to be for it. Four years ago, right here in this forum, he was
asked the same question: Can’t people be able to import drugs from
Canada? You know what he said? “I think that makes sense. I think
that’s a good idea” -- four years ago. Now, the president said, “I’m not
blocking that.” Ladies and gentlemen, the president just didn’t level
with you right now again. He did block it, because we passed it in the
United States Senate. We sent it over to the House, that you could
import drugs. We took care of the safety issues. We’re not talking
about third-world drugs. We’re talking about drugs made right here in
the United States of America that have American brand names on them
and American bottles. And we’re asking to be able to allow you to get
them.1
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1
President George W. Bush & Senator John Kerry, Second Presidential Debate (Oct. 8,
2004)
(transcript
available
at
Commission
on
Presidential
Debates,
http://www.debates.org/pages/trans2004c.html (last visited April 10, 2006)) [hereinafter Second BushKerry Debate]. The subject of importing drugs from Canada was revisited by Senator Kerry in the
third presidential debate. See Senator John Kerry, Third Presidential Debate (Oct. 13, 2004)
(transcript
available
at
Commission
on
Presidential
Debates,
http://www.debates.org/pages/trans2004d.html (last visited April 10, 2006)) [hereinafter Third BushKerry Debate]. To some extent, these positions run counter to partisan stereotypes. We see here,
among other things, a liberal Democrat advocating for enabling Americans to opt out of certain
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I. INTRODUCTION
This bit of recent political history is ideal in this regard, if no other: It vividly
encapsulates a public dispute considered important at the time of the campaign
and—at least thus far—throughout the presidential term at issue in that campaign.
Thus, we begin with a parochial perspective on one corner of United States (U.S.)
international trade policy; that is, many U.S. citizens would prefer to import, or “reimport,” their prescription pharmaceuticals from Canada, although such importation
is not permitted under federal law.2 Because the federal law in question was duly
enacted pursuant to the powers granted the federal Congress under the Commerce
Clause of the U.S. Constitution, the federal ban preempts any putative state law
statutes and regulations to the contrary.3
The fact that such cross-border trade is prohibited has been a source of ample
public controversy on both sides of the U.S./Canada border. Within the United
States, a widespread perception of cross-border price disparities is discussed
frequently and prominently in the national press;4 it is debated in our presidential
campaigns;5 and it is an ongoing source of federal and state legislative activity.6
putatively inefficient federal regulatory strictures while a conservative Republican President
advocates regulatory caution before expanded market choices.
2
See, e.g., Pam Belluck, Boldly Crossing the Line for Cheaper Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11,
2003, at A38; Marc Kaufman, Illinois Governor Launching Program to Reimport Drugs: Move May
Force FDA’s Hand, WASH . POST , Aug. 17, 2004, at A13 (regarding state government engineered
importation schemes). The ways in which such importation may run afoul of federal law are diverse
and call, at least in certain instances, for substantial analysis. Briefly, drug products imported from
Canada (or any other nation) are liable to run afoul of federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA)
provisions regarding traffic in unapproved new drugs and/or traffic in drugs that are improperly
labeled (“misbranded”). See also 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2000) and 21 U.S.C. §§ 352, 353 (2000),
respectively. In addition, the FDCA provides that, generally, only a drug’s original manufacturer may
return a U.S. manufactured drug to U.S. soil once that drug has been shipped abroad. 21 U.S.C.A. §
381(d)(1) (West Supp. 2005).
3
See Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 348 (2001) (state-law fraudon-the-FDA claims would conflict with FDA’s performance of its statutory responsibilities and
regulatory objectives); Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982)
(preemption of state law that conflicts with the exercise of federal power, including regulatory
power); Walsh v. U.S., 331 U.S. 432, 434 (1947) (the 1938 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
“rests upon the constitutional power resident in Congress to regulate interstate commerce … [and]
seeks to keep interstate channels free from deleterious, adulterated and misbranded articles of the
specified types.”). This is, of course, the barest sketch of a federalism analysis, as it might be applied
to the motley of State schemes at issue. Twenty-two states have considered importation or reimportation legislation in 2005. The National Conference of State Legislatures, 2005 Prescription
Drug State Legislation, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/drugdisc05.htm (last visited April 10,
2006) (summarizing information on such legislation).
4
See, e.g., Joel Baglole, Getting the Gray Out: Canadian and U.S. Regulators Are Looking
to Impose Order on the Sale of Cheap Online Drugs, WALL S T. J., Feb. 11, 2003, at R6; Belluck,
supra note 2, at A38; Kaufman, supra note 2 at A13; Michael S. Rosenwald, Merck to Discount Drugs
for Uninsured: Prices to Compare to Canadian Imports, WASH. POST , Apr. 20, 2005, at E2; Kelly K.
Spors, Canadian Drugs Are Getting Cheaper: Online Pharmacies Catering to Americans Cut Costs by
Finding New Suppliers, WALL. S T. J., July 22, 2004, at D1; Bob Tedeschi, E-Commerce; As the
Debate Continues, Opinions Are Divided over the Merits of Allowing Online Drug Purchases from
Canada, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2004, at C4.
5
See, e.g., Second Bush-Kerry Debate, supra note 1; Third Bush-Kerry Debate, supra note 1.
6
See, e.g., Ceci Connolly, GOP Spars Over Drug Import Bill Some Senators Aim To
Regulate Purchase, WASH. P OST , Apr. 20, 2005, at A23 (debate within GOP regarding merits of
importation legislation). See also 21 U.S.C.A. § 384(b) (West Supp. 2005) (authorizing the
promulgation of regulations for the importation of drugs from Canada; 21 U.S.C.A. §384(l) (West
Supp. 2005)(stipulating that the authorization is effective only if the Secretary of HHS certifies, e.g.,
that re-importation poses no additional risk to American consumers). The history of federal
legislation regarding Canadian importation, together with attempts by certain States to import – or
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Indeed, Congressional consideration of—and qualified support for—certain forms of
parallel trade in pharmaceuticals has become the Bill that will not die (or live either).
Congress, across two presidential administrations, has repeatedly authorized certain
drug re-importation schema, contingent on the approval of the U.S. federal Food and
Drug Administration (FDA).7 FDA has not, as yet, granted such approval, and one
may wonder about the extent to which FDA stinginess in that regard has—or has
not—come as a surprise to Congress.8 The topic has been similarly controversial in
Canada, albeit for somewhat different reasons.9
Within the United States, the debate typically is cast as President Bush and
Senator Kerry cast it; that is, as a risk management problem of safety versus cost,
with substantial disagreement about the accounting particulars of the fundamental
variables.10 In that regard, the puzzle is, as one subcommittee of Congress succinctly
put it: “Are Americans being protected or gouged?”11 The question appears simple,
although on its face are complex technical issues of drug safety, as well as questions
about regulatory integrity, competing (pharmaceutical) market systems, and equity
in international trade policy. Not far beneath the surface are questions about the
scope of the intellectual property (IP) protections afforded to pharmaceuticals, as the
most significant price disparities are observed with respect to certain patentprotected drugs or drugs afforded some other measure of exclusivity in the market.12
What drug re-importation advocates propose is a special case of “parallel trade.”
Parallel trade is simply the lawful movement of goods across international borders
independent of the consent of the manufacturers of those goods and independent of

permit the importation of – prescription pharmaceuticals will be discussed more fully in Section II,
infra. See also S.B. 410, §§ 36-43, 79th Leg. (Tex. 2005) (authorizing Texas State Board of Pharmacy
to approve Canadian pharmacies for Texas drug importation and requiring information posted for
State residents on web site); S. 49 2005-6 Gen. Aseem. (Vt. 2005) (authorizing Vermont to join multistate importation plan); National Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 3.
7
See infra text accompanying notes 46-47 (regarding the Medicare, Prescription Drug
Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003).
8
Secretary Thompson explicitly rejected the prospect of such a certification in 2001 and
current HHS Secretary Leavitt has not, thus far, suggested that he intends to reverse the course charted
by his predecessor. See Robert Pear, In a Turnaround, White House Kills Drug-Import Plan, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 27, 2000, at A1 (describing Dep’t of Health and Human Serv. Sec. Donna Shalala’s letter
to President Clinton on Dec. 26, 2000); Letter from Tommy Thompson, Secretary, Dep’t of Health
and Human Serv., to Senator James Jeffords, (July 9, 2001), available at
http://www.fda.gov/oc/po/thompson/medsact.html.
9
Canada, plainly, has been concerned that open trade with the United States might threaten
the Canadian drug supply, Canadian pricing, or both. See, e.g., Reuters, Canada Seeks to Control
Sales of Drugs to U.S.: Health Minister Aims to Protect Domestic Supply, MSNBC NEWS, June 29,
2005, http://msnbc.msn.com/id/8406928/ (reporting on draft legislation in the Canadian parliament
aimed at protecting Canadian drug supplies by prohibiting bulk exportation to the U.S.).
10
See Second Bush-Kerry Debate, supra note 1; Third Bush-Kerry Debate, supra note 1.
11
International Prescription Drug Parity: Are Americans Being Protected or Gouged?:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Human Rights & Wellness of the H. Comm. on Govt. Reform, 108th
Cong.
1
(2003),
available
at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=108_house_hearings&docid=f:87228.pdf.
12
See, e.g., P ATRICIA M. DANZON, P RICE C OMPARISONS FOR P HARMACEUTICALS : A R EVIEW
OF
U.S.
AND
C ROSS-NATIONAL
S TUDIES
28,
33-34
(1999),
available
at
http://hc.wharton.upenn.edu/danzon/PDF%20Files/AEI%20Price%20Comparisons%20for%20Pharma
ceuticals%201999.pdf; Patricia M. Danzon & Michael F. Furukawa, Prices and Availability of
Pharmaceuticals: Evidence from Nine Countries, HEALTH AFFAIRS, at W3-521, Oct. 29, 2003,
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w3.521v1. Drug products may be afforded
significant Intellectual Property protections beyond those insured by patent and trademark rights. See
infra text accompanying notes 65-68.

250

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LAW & MEDICINE VOL. 32 NO. 2&3 2006

distribution channels established by those manufacturers.13 Parallel trade depends
on both significant cross-border price disparities and the absence of statutory and
regulatory impediments to the free flow of goods.14 In the case of pharmaceuticals,
we have the first, but not the second. The retail prices of certain prescription drugs
are lower in Canada than they are in the United States, especially for certain drugs
and certain purchasers.15 Because of legal barriers to trade, however, prescription
drugs do not flow freely across the border and arbitrage between the two markets is
constrained, albeit continuing.16
Beyond the particular U.S./Canada discussion have been controversy and
concerns about a complex of issues with regard to parallel trade in pharmaceuticals
generally. Some of these have focused on the possibility of parallel trade between
the U.S. and broader international markets.17 Some have focused on parallel trade
within and without the European Union.18 Finally, many have been concerned with
particular issues raised by the health and economic challenges of the developing
world; in particular, there has been substantial attention paid to IP protection, trade
policy, and differential pricing as they bear on the Malaria and HIV/AIDS crises in
sub-Saharan Africa.19 Underlying these broader discussions are not just the familiar
themes of equitable pricing and regulatory safety, but the question of whether
competing IP regimes for pharmaceuticals imply a fundamental tradeoff between
13

See, e.g., European Commission’s Directorate-General for Competition, Glossary,
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/general_info/p_en.html (last visited Aptr. 10, 2006).
14
See, e.g., Belinda Isaac, The Free Movement of Goods II: Pharmaceuticals, Trade Marks,
and Parallel Imports in W.R. C ORNISH ET AL ., P HARMACEUTICAL MEDICINE, BIOTECHNOLOGY , AND
EUROPEAN LAW 25, 29-32 (Richard Goldberg & Julian Lonbay eds., 2000).
15
Which products are less expensive, by how much, and under what conditions, is a more
complex matter than the public debate has allowed. See, e.g., Danzon, supra note 12, at 2
(“[M]inority Staff Reports are based on flawed methodology that leads to seriously upward-biased
estimates of the price differences between sectors within the United States and between the United
States and Canada or Mexico.”); Danzon & Furukawa, supra note 12, at W3-522 (noting that U.S.foreign price differentials are roughly in line with income and smaller for drugs than for other medical
services.)
16
Although trade barriers between the U.S. and Canada under the terms of the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), are, generally speaking, few, provisions for trade in
pharmaceuticals and biotech products have not, as of the time of this writing, been incorporated in that
treaty. See North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289
(Parts 1-3), 32 I.L.M. 605 (Parts 4-8)..
17
See, e.g., R OGER PILON, DRUG R EIMPORTATION : THE FREE MARKET SOLUTION : C ATO
INSTITUTE
POLICY
ANALYSIS
521
11
(2004),
available
at,
http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=2305 (ban on reimportation should be lifted to
discourage free-riding).
18
Generally speaking, parallel trade in pharmaceuticals is permitted within the European
Union whereas parallel trade between member states and non-member states is not. See W.R.
CORNISH ET AL., PHARMACEUTICAL MEDICINE , B IOTECHNOLOGY , AND EUROPEAN LAW (Richard
Goldberg & Julian Lonbay eds., 2000) (providing a broad overview of European Union issues).
19
See, e.g., COMM . ON THE ECONOMICS OF ANTIMALARIAL DRUGS, B OARD ON GLOBAL
HEALTH , INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE , SAVING LIVES, B UYING TIME: ECONOMICS OF MALARIA DRUGS IN
AGE OF RESISTANCE (Kenneth J. Arrow et al. eds., 2004), available at
AN
http://www.nap.edu/books/0309092183/html; WORLD HEALTH ORG . C OMM . ON MACROECONOMICS
AND HEALTH , R EPORT OF WORKING G RP. 4, HEALTH & THE I NT’ L. ECONOMY (2002); Maria Neira,
Experience With Access to Essential Medicines for Tropical Diseases, World Health Organization,
WHO-WTO Workshop in Differential Pricing and Financing of Essential Drugs, Høsbjør, Nor. (Apr.
2001),
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/hosbjor_presentations_e/20a_neira_e.pdf;
Dorothy
Ochola et al., Uganda HIV/AIDS Drugs Access Initiative: Current Experience with Differential
Pricing of HIV/AIDS related Drugs in Uganda, World Health Organization, WHO-WTO Workshop in
Differential Pricing and Financing of Essential Drugs, Høsbjør, Nor. (Apr. 2001), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/hosbjor_presentations_e/19ochola_e.pdf.
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present price competition and the possibility (or rate) of innovation; that is, among
other things, a balancing of present and future welfare.20
Plainly, a complete discussion of such issues and their interrelationships is beyond
the scope of any one paper—hence, our beginning with a relatively local corner of
the debate. Recently, important questions have been raised about whether, or to
what extent, relevant national or international policies might be optimized.21
Suggested in this paper—but argued elsewhere—is that no clear, general solution to
the optimization problem is likely forthcoming.22 I suppose that, the more
fundamental problems seen in, e.g., attempts to rationalize antitrust and IP policy
remain, only to be amplified as we account for problems of trade, regulatory, and
international health policy as well.23 Thus, optimizing the balance between IP and
Antitrust doctrine becomes more difficult still as the matrix of legal, economic, and
institutional considerations expands to fit our price discrimination problem.24
Leaving aside the problem of a general solution, my overarching goals in this
paper are two. First, I shall argue that various Canada-focused re-importation
20
See, e.g., W.R. Cornish, The Free Movement of Goods I: Pharmaceuticals, Patents and
Parallel Trade, in PHARMACEUTICAL MEDICINE , BIOTECHNOLOGY, AND EUROPEAN LAW 11, 24
(Richard Goldberg & Julian Lonbay eds., 2000) (the effect of patents as incentives to innovate is
enhanced if patentees can engage in international price discrimination); Patricia M. Danzon & Adrian
Towse, Differential Pricing for Pharmaceuticals: Reconciling Access, R&D and Patents, 3 INT’L J.
HEALTH C ARE FIN. & ECON. 183 (2003) (differential pricing, based on Ramsey pricing principles, is
the second best efficient means of paying for the global joint costs of pharmaceutical R&D); Stephen
Latham, Pharmaceutical Costs: An Overview and Analysis of Legal and Policy Responses by the
States, 24 J. LEGAL MED. 141, 173 (2003) (our present goal of establishing or maintaining low drug
prices is in fundamental tension with our long-term goal of developing new treatments and
distributing them to a growing, and increasingly long-lived, population); WORLD HEALTH ORG.
COMM . ON MACROECONOMICS AND HEALTH , supra note 19, at 41 (regarding “struggle” to balance
static and dynamic efficiency in price differentiation). But c.f., Kevin Outterson, Pharmaceutical
Arbitrage: Balancing Access and Innovation in International Prescription Drug Markets, 5 YALE J.
HEALTH POL ’Y L. & ETHICS 193, 222 (2005) (arbitrage between high income markets may not damage
innovation and the burden of proof for IP rights and barriers to parallel trade lies with the
pharmaceuticals industry).
21
Danzon & Towse, supra note 20, at 184 (differential pricing, based on Ramsey pricing
principles, is the second best efficient means of paying for the global joint costs of pharmaceutical
R&D and would also be consistent with standard norms of equity); Daniel J. Gifford, How Do the
Social Benefits and Costs of the Patent System Stack up in Pharmaceuticals?, 12 J. INTELL. P ROP. L.
75, 112 (2004) (patent term may be supra-optimal for some pharmaceuticals); Outterson, supra note
20, at 196 (applying the “heuristic device of optimal pharmaceutical rents”) (emphasis added).
22
Daniel Gilman, Something Shy—Perhaps Far Shy—of Optimization: Reconciling Price,
Property, Trade, and Trust for Medicines on a Global Stage (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author). See also infra note 24, regarding some of the themes of that discussion.
23
See Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV . L. REV .
1813, 1815 (1984) (expressing pessimism about the prospects of determining an optimal patent term
and an optimal balance of patent and anti-trust policy).
24
See id. at 1848. Kaplow’s skepticism about an optimal, joint patent-anti-trust policy is
borne of what might be seen as theoretical, technical, and institutional concerns. Although an
industry-specific focus may diminish a few of the problems he raises, it may just as easily amplify
others. Here, we are concerned about an exploding complexity in the problem space when we seek to
optimize across more, rather than fewer, bodies of law, and as we expand the types of institutions and
legal systems implicated across these subjects on an international stage. Indeed, optimizing the
fundamental tradeoff within IP policy itself is liable to be, to some extent, arbitrary. The value of any
particular innovation is a highly contingent matter, of course, hanging on diverse properties of the
market and the strategic action, or inaction, of competitors. At the same time, problem solving—
within the domain of pharmaceutical development more generally—is not likely a natural kind and not
likely to covary in any straightforward fashion with the resources placed at its disposal. If we
suppose, further, that diverse economies may model diverse discount rates, we confound further the
hope of a systematic balancing of the costs and benefits entailed by any particular IP policy.
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schemes are not likely worth the candle. That is so not because Canadian drug
regulation is radically inferior to U.S. drug regulation—or even radically different
from it—but because there are substantial costs to dissolving the regulatory border
between the two nations with relatively little to be gained in doing so. In brief, there
are regulatory costs because: drugs are beneficial products but risky ones; regulation
is a way of managing those risks, not a way of eliminating them; and parallel trade
confounds the regulatory task. Without substantial administrative oversight, parallel
trade in drugs is dangerous.25 That substantial administrative task is not costjustified because, whatever we might wish to do to control drug prices, it is
extremely unlikely that we can do much at all by integrating the U.S. and Canadian
markets.26
Second, I will consider some of the costs of administration as they may apply to
parallel trade in pharmaceuticals more generally. Advocates of parallel trade with
Canada may argue that the U.S. and Canada provide a special case of regulatory
convergence, or the de facto harmonization of two regulatory systems. When we
consider regulatory harmonization more broadly however, we need to consider not
just the benefits to be had from streamlined regulations but the costs implied in
administering them. I suggest that harmonization may impose special agency costs
beyond those typical of bureaucratic administration, costs that may come to swamp
what may be seen as efficiencies of regulatory production.27 I consider, then,
European harmonization as it appears to model some of the costs, benefits, and
difficulties of regulatory integration more generally. We would do well to observe
these phenomena but not—at present—to import them.
II. LEGAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND
A. CONSTRUCTING THE REGULATORY BORDER
The borders of the United States are, among other things, expressions of its
sovereignty. The borders of Canada are, similarly, expressions of its sovereignty.
Concomitant with that sovereignty, and constrained by various international
agreements, each nation controls the flow of goods across its borders, however
imperfect the exercise of that control may be.28 That boundary is not, in itself, an
25
Of course, not all risk management endeavors are efficient or even beneficial. The general
argument, developed below, is that pharmaceuticals markets are especially good candidates for
regulation. See generally R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960)
(regarding social costs amenable to administrative management).
26
Pessimism about the efficacy of parallel trade as a price management tool, independent of
questions regarding its larger costs, has been expressed elsewhere. See, e.g., CONG. B UDGET OFFICE ,
WOULD P RESCRIPTION DRUG IMPORTATION R EDUCE U.S. DRUG S PENDING?, ECONOMIC B UDGET
ISSUES BRIEF passim (Apr. 29, 2004), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/54xx/doc5406/04-29PrescriptionDrugs.pdf. We may also wonder about the extent to which we ought to manage those
prices, since the legally protected market power that permits the pricing is the fundamental
inducement to innovation in the industry.
27
For a general definition of agency costs, see, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & William H.
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, in
FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE LAW 7, 7-12 (Roberta Romano ed., 1993).
28
The demarcation of the shared border between the United States and Canada has its roots in
the Treaty of Paris of 1783, which, not incidentally, brought a formal end to the American
Revolutionary War. See The Treaty of Paris, U.S.-U.K., art 2, Sept. 3, 1783, 8 Stat. 80. The
International Boundary Commission, charged with surveying and mapping that boundary, was
established by the Jay Treaty of 1794.
International Boundary Commission,
http://www.internationalboundarycommission.org/ibcpg2.htm (follow “Boundary History” hyperlink)
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obstacle to parallel trade in pharmaceuticals across it. As a general matter, trade
across the boundary is governed by various international agreements, chief among
them being agreements aimed at the furtherance of free trade, not its suppression.
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and subsequent Uruguay
Round Agreements, of which the U.S. and Canada are both signatories, nonetheless
provide WTO member nations with considerable latitude in maintaining various
regulatory standards regarding, e.g., health and environmental protections, despite
the fact that such standards may impede trade.29 The North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), a central objective of which is to eliminate non-tariff barriers
to trade, also preserves the ability of signatories to maintain health and safety
standards.30 The central impediments, in this matter, are not the political boundary
between the two countries or any positive agreement between them.31 Rather, the
impediments are to be found in specific statutory provisions on either side of the
border and, especially, in their regulatory implementation.32
The regulation by FDA of prescription drugs, among other products, is well
established.33 As a general matter, the federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act

(last visited Apr. 2, 2006) (containing information on the Commission and the border). Further
refinements to the boundary have been recognized in the centuries since, and certain limited
particulars remain contested. See id.
29
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), pt. 5, March 24, 1948, 61 Stat., 55
U.N.T.S. 194. Although GATT provided rules governing a considerable portion of world trade from
its inception, it was, until 1995, essentially a provisional agreement. Most formal requirements
related to the GATT arose from the World Trade Organization’s (WTO’s) Uruguay Round
negotiations, conducted from 1986-1994, and signed at the Marrakesh Ministerial Meeting in April
1994. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations,
April 15, 1994, April 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 14. The Uruguay Round’s Agreement on Technical
Barriers to Trade, for example, recognizes that countries have the right to establish protection, at
levels they consider appropriate, for example for human, animal or plant life or health or the
environment, and should not be prevented from taking measures necessary to ensure those levels of
protection are met. Id. at 1868 U.N.T.S. 120. WTO legal texts and summaries are maintained at
World Trade Organization, http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm (last visited Dec.
2, 2005).
30
See North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), supra note 16, 32 I.L.M. at 387:
Each Party may, in accordance with this Agreement, adopt, maintain or apply any
standards-related measure, including any such measure relating to safety, the protection
of human … life or health… and any measure to ensure its enforcement or
implementation. Such measures include those to prohibit the importation of a good of
another Party … that fails to comply with the applicable requirements of those measures
or to complete the Party's approval procedures.
For a general discussion of the implication of NAFTA for pharmaceuticals, see Lars Noah,
NAFTA’s Impact on the Trade in Pharmaceuticals, 33 HOUS . L. R EV . 1293 (1997).
31
There are, of course, economic costs associated with importation and exportation across a
regulated (and policed) border that are the product of positive agreements regarding, e.g., customs
operations at the border crossings themselves, which impose costs above transportation costs narrowly
construed.
32
On the U.S. side, regulatory authority over different aspects of the border is distributed. Of
central interest generally are the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of the Treasury,
the Department of State, and the Office of the United States Trade Representative. The boundary
itself is charted and maintained jointly, by the International Boundary Commission (the U.S.
Commissioner of which reports to the Secretary of State, while the Canadian Commissioner is located
within the Department of Natural Resources Canada). See International Boundary Commission,
http://www.internationalboundarycommission.org/ibcpg2.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2006). For our
particular purposes, the role of the FDA in establishing the legal boundary for trade in prescription
drugs is central.
33
See U.S. v. Walsh, 331 U.S. 432, 434 (1947) (the 1938 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act “rests upon the constitutional power resident in Congress to regulate interstate commerce … [and]
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(“FDCA” or “the Act”) vests the authority to promulgate regulations under the Act
in the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).34 By
regulation, that authority is delegated to the Commissioner of the FDA.35 Regarding
the importation of drugs, the Act assigns authority jointly to the Secretary of HHS
and the Secretary of the Treasury.36
The ways in which such importation may run afoul of federal law are diverse.
Briefly, drug products imported from Canada (or any other nation) likely violate
FDCA provisions regarding the trafficking of unapproved new drugs, adulterated
drugs, and/or “misbranded” (improperly labeled) drugs.37 As a statutory matter,
these categories of prohibited products are interrelated.38 As a policy matter, FDA
has long viewed, e.g., drug safety and drug labeling as inextricably linked.39 In
brief, drugs are more-or-less safe, and more-or-less effective, in context, and the
relevant context has a great deal to do with the information surrounding a drug.
Drugs may be reasonably safe and efficacious for certain indicated uses, in certain
populations, at certain dosage, according to certain administration, and
acknowledging certain precautions, warnings, contraindications, and possible
adverse events.40 They function and are regulated not just as chemical entities, but
as chemical entities conceived and applied under particular descriptions.41
Contamination or other physical degradation of drug products, in transit or
storage, may render them “adulterated” under the act.42 In addition, because the Act
prohibits interstate commerce in any drug not generally recognized “as safe and
effective for use under the conditions prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the
labeling thereof,” such changes in an existing product may run afoul of provisions
regarding unapproved new drugs.43 Counterfeit products may be similarly in
conflict with the Act. Labeling or dosage changes made specifically to suit the
Canadian market, may render a product “misbranded” or an unapproved “new
drug.”44 Finally, the FDCA provides that, generally, only a drug’s original

seeks to keep interstate channels free from deleterious, adulterated, and misbranded articles of the
specified types.”)
34
See 21 U.S.C. § 371(a) (authority to promulgate regulations vested in the Secretary).
35
See 21 C.F.R. § 10.40(a) (2005).
36
See 21 U.S.C. § 381.
37
See 21 U.S.C. §§ 355 (a), 351, and 352, 353 (regarding new, adulterated, and misbranded
drugs respectively), 21 U.S.C. § 355 (a) (prohibiting the introduction or delivery for introduction into
interstate commerce of any unapproved new drug), and 21 U.S.C. § 331(a) (prohibiting “the
introduction or delivery for introduction into interstate commerce of any … drug … that is adulterated
or misbranded).
38
For example, a drug is adulterated if, among other things, it fails to have the safety,
strength, quality, and purity it “purports or is represented to possess.” See 21 U.S.C. § 351(a)(2)(B)
(emphasis added). A drug is “misbranded” if its labeling is “false or misleading in any particular.”
See 21 U.S.C. § 352(a). A new drug is any drug not generally recognized “as safe and effective for
use under the conditions prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the labeling thereof.” See 21
U.S.C. § 321(p).
39
New Drug and Antibiotic Regulations, 50 Fed. Reg. 7452, 7470 (Feb. 22, 1985) (“Drug
labeling serves as the standard under which FDA determines whether a product is safe and effective.”)
FDA regulates all such labeling, including “all written, printed, or graphic matter” marketing the drug.
21 C.F.R. § 1.3(a).
40
See 21 C.F.R. §§ 201.5, 201.56-7 (2005).
41
See New Drug and Antibiotic Regulations, supra note 39.
42
A drug may become adulterated should mishandling cause it to fail to have the strength,
quality, or purity it purports to have in its labeling. See 21 U.S.C. § 351(a).
43
See 21 U.S.C. §§ 321(p), 351(a), 355(a).
44
See 21 U.S.C. §§ 351(a), 352(a).
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manufacturer may return a U.S. manufactured drug to U.S. soil once that drug has
been shipped abroad.45
The Medicare, Prescription Drug Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003
does provide for the promulgation of regulations to permit pharmacists and
wholesalers to import prescription drugs into the U.S. from Canada.46 At the same
time, that section of the FDCA was drafted to provide the Secretary with a suicide
brake on precisely the activity the section contemplates: The importation section
itself states that it “shall become effective only if the Secretary certifies to the
Congress that the implementation of this section will--(A) pose no additional risk to
the public's health and safety; and (B) result in a significant reduction in the cost of
covered products to the American consumer.”47
Read strictly, the conditions required by subsection 804(l) would be extremely
difficult, if not impossible, to meet.48 Then-Secretary Thompson explicitly rejected
the prospect of such a certification in 2001 and Secretary Leavitt has not, thus far,
suggested that he intends to reverse the course charted by his predecessor.49 An
earlier statutory provision—also authorizing the Secretary to promulgate regulations
for an importation scheme, contingent on the Secretary’s own assessment of the
scheme’s safety, was rejected by HHS Secretary Donna Shalala.50 In effect, the
Congress has assigned to FDA—via statute and regulatory delegation—the very
possibility of drug importation, and not just its administration. As a result, the
importation (or re-importation) of U.S. manufactured drugs into the United States,
whether by a private U.S. citizen, a Canadian citizen, or a State or Provincial
government is liable to be in violation of the FDCA—in violation at least of Section
801 of the Act and very likely in violation of one of the provisions of Section 301 or
Section 505 as well.51
State legislatures have been nonetheless active in considering, or attempting to
implement, the importation of prescription pharmaceuticals. Twenty-two states
45

See 21 U.S.C. § 381(d)(1).
See 21 U.S.C. § 384(b) (Supp. I 2005).
21 U.S.C. § 384(l).
48
The question posed in the Second Bush-Kerry debate seems to suggest that U.S.-approved
and manufactured drugs are not only cheaper, once transported to Canada, but safer. See Second Bush
Kerry Debate, supra note 1. That is dubious, if not incoherent. Drug products generally cannot
become safer via increasingly complex distribution pathways and increasingly long time in transport,
except to the extent that product degradation may serve to reduce both therapeutic efficacy and side
effects. An argument has been made that certain importation schemes, by simplifying packaging
options and possible distribution complexities in the U.S. market, will “dramatically” reduce
medication errors and the risk of counterfeit drugs. See RAM KAMATH & SCOTT MCKIBBIN, ILL.
DEP’T OF CENT . MGMT. SERV., R EPORT ON FEASIBILITY OF EMPLOYEES AND RETIREES P URCHASING
PRESCRIPTION DRUGS F ROM C ANADIAN PHARMACIES 11 (2003), available at http://www.isaverx.net/assetsrx/canadian_rx_report.pdf. That argument is speculative at best, even on the
assumption that the scheme will function, on implementation, precisely as designed.
49
See Thompson, supra note 8.
50
See Pear, supra note 8.
51
See, e.g., Letter from Randall W. Lutter, Acting Associate Commissioner for Policy
Planning, Food and Drug Administration, to Honorable Greg Abbott, Attorney General of the State of
Texas
(Jul.
27,
2005),
available
at
http://www.fda.gov/oc/opacom/hottopics/importdrugs/abbott072705.html
(contemplated
Texas
program not permitted); Letter from Randall W. Lutter, Acting Associate Commissioner for Policy
and Planning, U.S. Food and Drug Administration, to Douglas M. Duncan, County Executive,
Montgomery County Maryland Office of the County Executive (Nov. 8, 2005), available at
http://www.fda.gov/oc/opacom/hottopics/importdrugs/duncan110805.html (FDA cannot issue waiver
for program liable to involve illegal imports);. Copies of these, and additional letters, may be found at
http://www.fda.gov/importeddrugs (last visited May 9, 2006).
46
47
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considered such bills in 2005 alone, although most did not enact them; however, at
least one State Attorney General has postponed implementation of an enacted statute
in response to FDA warnings of illegality.52
B. THE ARCHITECTURE
53
AND BEYOND

OF

PRICE DISCRIMINATION ACROSS

THE

49TH PARALLEL,

Consumers of any good may be more or less price sensitive, and many U.S.
consumers have found drug prices to be high and rising—not surprising, perhaps, as
prescription drug spending has risen consistently in recent years, outpacing, among
other things, all other categories of healthcare expenditures.54 In response, many
U.S. consumers have become especially price conscious, seeking not just substitute
goods (and services), but substitute channels of supply.55 Moreover, a perception
that identical goods are subject to radical price disparities across an arbitrary
boundary has given rise to a sense of inequity or unfairness, as conspicuous price
discrimination may be wont to do more generally.56 Hence, we note public pressure
for the legislation mentioned above, as well as sub rosa importation from Canada,
Mexico, and, to a lesser extent, the European Union and Asia.57
The question of equitable pricing is far from trivial and I do not mean to settle it
here. What prices ought to be, within or across borders, is a complex matter to be
left for other days. Before continuing, I offer merely a few brief comments directed
at the supposition that pricing ought to be uniform. First, just as U.S. law recognizes
that certain forms of price discrimination play an important role in competitive
markets, we ought not to expect uniform pricing across the U.S. market or across
international borders.58 Second, the degree to which we should wish to import
52
See, e.g., S.B. 410, §§ 36-43, 79th Leg. (Tex. 2005); Susan Konig, Texas Postpones Drug
CARE
NEWS,
Oct.
1,
2005,
Importation
from
Canada,
HEALTH
http://www.heartland.org/Article.cfm?artId=17760 (implementation postponed by Texas Attorney
General Greg Abbott); National Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 3 and accompanying
text.
53
The term “49th Parallel” is used here in its colloquial sense as descriptive of the US/Canada
border, although in fact it describes merely a portion of that border, as Canada’s two most populous
cities lie south of the parallel and the largest of the United States lies north of it.
54
See CONG . BUDGET OFFICE , supra note 26, at 1; Heather Won Tesoriero, Drug Firms
Raised Prices 5.5% in First Half of Year, WALL ST . J., Aug. 2, 2005, at D4 (observing a 5.5%
increase in drug prices in the first half of 2005, roughly equivalent to the hike in the first half of
F AMILY
FOUND.,
PRESCRIPTION
DRUG
TRENDS
1
(2004)
2004);
K AISER
http://www.kff.org/rxdrugs/upload/Prescription-Drug-Trends-October-2004-UPDATE.pdf
(doubledigit growth each of last eight years).
55
See Belluck, supra note 2 (regarding private sources of re-importation from Canada);
Kathleen Doheny, Think Twice Before Buying Prescription Drugs in Mexico, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 8,
2004, at L3 (high percentage of counterfeit drugs and legal issues in importation).
56
See, e.g., International Prescription Drug Parity: Are Americans Being Protected or
Gouged?, supra note 11.
57
See Belluck, supra note 2 (regarding private access to Canadian markets); Connolly, supra
note 6 (regarding purchases from Canada, Mexico, and Europe); Doheny, supra note 55 (regarding
purchases from Mexico); Kaufman, supra note 2 (regarding public access to Canadian markets). We
note too, what will be explained more fully below; that is, that consumer perceptions of identity or
similarity between goods may, as perceptions, be more or less accurate in any given case. More
generally, both within and across borders, goods may be perceived as close or even perfect substitutes
independent of any technical analysis of the goods in question.
58
For example, prohibited “price discrimination” under the Robinson-Patman Act has been
read somewhat narrowly by the courts, with good reason. As a consequence, much of the price
differentiation observed in diverse markets has not been held violative of Section 2(a) of the
Robinson-Patman Act. See Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. 13(a) (2000). For example, the Supreme
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foreign pricing is at least an open question. In pharmaceuticals, as elsewhere—but
perhaps especially in the realm of pharmaceuticals—we may wish to tolerate a
measure of supra-competitive pricing and a corresponding degree of deadweight
loss. Perhaps more accurately, deadweight loss today may pay dividends tomorrow,
and to the extent we care about both present and future welfare, we may very
reasonably seek to maximize social welfare diachronically, rather than
synchronically.59 Third, to the extent we wish to permit (and in certain cases award)
innovators a substantial degree of market power, we might view price discrimination
as a neutral or even beneficial phenomenon. In abstract, price discrimination does
not imply cost shifting, is not obviously pernicious, and may serve substantially to
reduce whatever deadweight loss is implicated by any given set of IP protections.60
Finally, Ramsey Optimal Pricing may represent—at least for some—a model of
equity in price discrimination across populations.61
That less expensive prescription drugs are available in Canadian pharmacies is
clear; less clear are the magnitude and distribution of cost differentials across the
Court has held that prohibited pricing under Robinson-Patman, “is of the same general character as the
injury inflicted by predatory pricing schemes actionable under § 2 of the Sherman Act.” Brooke
Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 221 (1993) (distinguishing anticompetitive below-cost pricing from mere price differentiation or competitive pricing).
59
Because competitive pricing entails no economic profits, it provides no incentives for the
long-term and risky investments required for pharmaceuticals development. We confer patent rights
(and other IP protection) because the promise of a degree of monopoly pricing power is incentive to
the investment required to develop useful--indeed socially important--goods. Although monopolist
pricing may implicate deadweight loss with regard to extant goods, such goods would not be
developed in the first place without economically adequate incentives. This is the common rationale
for patents generally, and one that may be especially applicable to drugs and biologics. See, e.g.,
Danzon & Towse, supra note 20, at 184-85 (patents offset high cost of pharmaceutical R&D); Tomas
J. Philipson et. al., IP & External Consumption Effects: Generalizations from Health Care Markets,
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11930, 2006) (combining problem of
technological change for goods with external consumption effects with problem of generating
adequate R&D for goods with private consumption effects). One might suppose that, if there is no
general solution to the problem of optimizing IP policy, any set of protections is as good as any other.
I think, however, on pragmatic grounds that developed economies would do well to avoid vitiating
extant protections.
60
In brief, once we allocate some degree of market power to a manufacturer (or other seller),
that manufacturer will seek to maximize profits by exploiting that market power, as constrained by
market demand. In the pure case, any marginal increment in price from the monopolist’s profit
maximizing price will decrease net revenue. This basic principle holds true in each market, whether a
manufacturer sells to one market or many. Hence, whatever else we might think of lower prices (via
public constraints or otherwise) in markets separate and isolated from our own, we should not imagine
that monopolists raise prices at home to “make up” for suppressed revenues abroad. See Danzon &
Towse, supra note 20, at 189-90 (providing a succinct discussion of welfare effects and cost shifting
issues).
61
Ramsey price discrimination (Ramsey Optimal Pricing or Ramsey Pricing) is a
straightforward extension of Frank Ramsey’s solution to the problem of designing a proportionate tax
system so that it can raise a given revenue while imposing a minimum decrease in utility. F.P.
Ramsey, A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation, 37 THE ECON. J. 47, 47 (1927). Ramsey pricing is
formally isomorphic with monopolist price discrimination, but subject to a profit constraint;
depending on the level of grain at which it can be implemented, it can, in the limit, serve to eliminate
entirely the deadweight loss associated with monopoly pricing. See, e.g., Danzon & Towse, supra
note 20, at 183 (differential pricing, based on Ramsey pricing principles, is the second best efficient
means of paying for the global joint costs of pharmaceutical R&D); JAYASHREE WATAL , WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION, WORKSHOP ON DIFFERENTIAL PRICING AND FINANCING OF ESSENTIAL
DRUGS:
B ACKGROUND
NOTE
11-15
(2001),
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/wto_background_e.pdf (differential pricing allows large
fixed research and development costs to be recovered with minimal distortions in resource allocation
while allowing provision of lower cost drugs to low income nations; parallel trade can disturb
favorable balance of Ramsey Optimal Pricing).
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two markets. Retail market comparisons have proven sample dependent and
contentious.62 Describing price differentials is confounded by variation within each
of the two markets and, in some instances, by commensurability issues across
different dosage, packaging, and distribution systems.63 Nonetheless, two rough
generalities are defensible: First, average retail prices for patent-protected
prescription pharmaceuticals are significantly lower in Canada than they are in the
U.S.; and second, average retail prices for generic prescription pharmaceuticals are
not.64
Cross-border price comparisons are in several ways complicated. First, it is not
the case that the two markets offer an identical range of products.65 Apart from
packaging and labeling differences, we note that numerous products differ in dosage
and modes of delivery across the border and that prescribing habits may likewise
differ.66 Moreover, although the large majority of market-leading, approved
molecules in the U.S. market are available in some form in Canada, a significant
percentage of new molecule products may be available in one country but not the
other—most typically, new products will be available in the U.S. but not in
Canada.67 Patricia Danzon has observed that there is a sort of sampling dilemma in
international market comparisons: Price comparisons based on “identical” products
inevitably involve relatively small and unrepresentative samples whereas marketwide comparisons inevitably involve a loss of standardization.68 In addition, even
those products available in what we might think of as “identical,” or
pharmacologically equivalent form (equivalent formulation, dosage, and delivery)
show substantial variation in relative prices across the border.69
Second, there is significant wholesale price differentiation within the U.S. and,
not incidentally, significant variation in price across retail consumers. Federally
funded drug purchases have no consistent wholesale price base. The federal
government is prohibited, by statute, from imposing formulary requirements or price
controls on drug purchases covered under the Medicare program.70 At the same
time, prices paid under other government programs are not similarly constrained.
Direct purchases by, e.g., the Department of Veterans Affairs and the Department of
Defense, are indexed to lowest-available-wholesale-prices via the Federal Supply
62
Compare S TAFF OF H. COMM. ON GOVT . R EFORM & OVERSIGHT , 105 TH CONG .,
PRESCRIPTION DRUG P RICING IN THE 1ST CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT IN MAINE : AN INTERNATIONAL
PRICE COMPARISON 4-8 (1998) (comparing Maine retail prices for ten drugs with prices in Canada &
Mexico), with D ANZON, supra note 12, at 2 (concluding that “Minority Staff Reports are based on
flawed methodology that leads to seriously upward biased estimates of the price differences between
sectors in the US and between the US and Canada and Mexico”).
63
See Danzon & Furukawa, supra note 12, at 522.
64
See id. at 527-28 (reporting Canadian prices for on-patent originator products as 64% of
U.S. prices), and at 525-26 (observing slightly lower Canadian prices for generics across data set); cf.
OFFICE OF PLANNING , U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., FDA WHITE P APER: GENERIC DRUG P RICES IN
U.S. ARE LOWER THAN DRUG PRICES IN C ANADA (2003), available at
THE
http://www.fda.gov/oc/whitepapers/drugprices.html (most of largest selling chronic use generics less
expensive in U.S.).
65
See Danzon & Furukawa, supra note 12, at 522.
66
See id.
67
See id. at 531-32.
68
See id. at 522.
69
See id. at 531-32.
70
Under the “noninterference” provision of the Act, “the Secretary--(1) may not interfere with
the negotiations between drug manufacturers and pharmacies and PDP sponsors; and (2) may not
require a particular formulary or institute a price structure for the reimbursement of covered part D
drugs.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395w-111(i) (West Supp. 2005).
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Schedule and General Accounting Office regulations.71 And although there are no
provisions for the exercise of federal buying power with regard to Medicaid covered
drugs, the States are permitted to negotiate prices for drugs listed on their Medicaid
formularies.72 Private purchasers may exert substantial market power or none: Large
managed care health plans pay, on average, considerably lower prices than do
individual, uncovered retail consumers, who pay the highest prices of all.73 Hospital
prices vary, with HMO-owned facilities often paying best wholesale prices and
unaffiliated hospitals paying closer to retail.74 Out-of-pocket expenditures vary
substantially across consumers—utilization is, of course, highly variable, and so are
the forms of prescription drug coverage to which consumers may have access.75
Third, differing market conditions may imply different net costs, which may be
reflected in different retail prices in turn. In addition to the different volume
packaging, distribution, and delivery differences we have mentioned, are variations
in, e.g., exchange rates, income effects, and the liability costs imposed under the
U.S. and Canadian legal systems.76
Given that the ideal whole markets comparison is thus elusive, it may not be
surprising that reported price differences have proven highly sample dependent,
variable, and, indeed, controversial.77 Still, we might venture a few generalizations
on the way to asking what cross-border disparities ought to be. First, cross-border
price differentials are smallest—perhaps negligible, net of distribution and liability
costs—with regard to generic products,.78 Indeed, generic prices are lower in the
U.S. than in all other countries, except for Canada.79 That is especially significant,
as generics have taken a majority share of the U.S. market, tallied by number of
prescriptions, and that share is rising, with generic (ANDA) applications on the
increase and a substantial portion of the protected pharmacopoeia going off-patent in
the coming decade.80
Second, patent-protected pioneer prescription drugs are, on average,
significantly more expensive in the U.S. than in Canada. Average Canadian
wholesale prices are roughly a third lower than average U.S. prices, with significant
variation in relative pricing across the market.81 Because of that difference, the
variance, and the disparate forms of prescription drug coverage to which Americans
71
See 38 U.S.C. §8126 (2000) (Federal Supply Schedule for Department of Defense,
Department of Veterans Affairs, Public Health Service, Coast Guard, and Indian Health Service
purchases); U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN S ERV ., REPORT TO THE P RESIDENT , PRESCRIPTION
DRUG C OVERAGE , SPENDING , UTILIZATION , AND P RICES 108 (2000), available at
http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/reports/drugstudy (regarding negotiation of prices).
72
See Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 669-70 (2003) (upholding
Maine formulary and pricing scheme).
73
See, e.g., U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., supra note 71, at 96, 98 (uninsured
consumers may pay 70-100% more than federal and other U.S. purchasers).
74
See id. at 106-107.
75
See id. at 10-20 (regarding different forms of coverage in population).
76
See generally Richard L. Manning, Products Liability and Prescription Drug Prices in
Canada and the United States, 40 J.L. & ECON. 203 (1997) (regarding effects of different tort
regimes).
77
See supra note 62 (comparing Minority Staff Report and Danzon analyses of price
disparities).
78
See supra note 12 (comparing Danzon & Furukawa estimate with FDA White Paper).
79
See Danzon & Furukawa, supra note 12, at 527-528.
80
See Aaron Smith, Generic Drug Flood Headed Our Way, CNNMONEY , Aug. 3, 2005,
http://money.cnn.com/2005/08/03/news/fortune500/generic/index.htm (branded drugs going off-patent
in next five years and spike in generic applications).
81
See Danzon & Furukawa, supra note 12, at 526.
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have (and fail to have) access, it ought not to be surprising that retail and out-ofpocket price differences are, for some consumers, and some drugs, extremely high.82
In that regard, even the most deeply flawed market comparisons may be useful as
possible case studies—they highlight the fact that, for some retail market baskets of
prescription drugs, cross-border price disparities can be marked, at double or more
the average differential.83
Third, the rough architecture of price differentials is approximately what we
would expect. Generic products are comparably priced because the prescription
generic markets—especially the unbranded prescription generic markets—are
approximately competitive, leaving relatively little room for price discrimination on
either side of the border.84 Substantial gaps are found with on-patent pioneer
products because profit-maximizing manufacturers can exert a greater degree of
market power for this class of drugs.85 Within this class, relative prices will vary
because both the degree of manufacturer market power and the consumers’ price
elasticity of demand are neither fixed nor constant by dint of patent protection. The
ordinal of the price differentials corresponds to the relative affluence of the national
markets, construed as national markets.
Still, although the price gap shrinks considerably when adjusted for income
differences, we do not, as a general matter, observe Ramsey Optimal price
differentials across the border.86 The gap between predicted Ramsey differentials is
greater still with regard to several European nations.87 Neither observation should
be surprising, as Canada and EU member states subject pharmaceuticals to various
regulatory price constraints or pressures; hence, observed price differentials are not
merely the product of monopolist response to national wealth differences.88 To the

82
See S TAFF OF H. COMM . ON GOVERNMENT . REFORM & OVERSIGHT , supra note 62, at 11-15;
Press Release, Public Citizen, State Drug Price Surveys Find Seniors Pay Double (Nov. 8, 1999),
http://www.citizen.org/pressroom/release.cfm?ID=427.
83
See, e.g., Press Release, Public Citizen, supra note 82 (reporting double and near-double
retail prices). D ANZON, supra note 12, has sharp and sound criticism for the methodology employed
in S TAFF OF H. C OMM . ON GOVERNMENT. REFORM & OVERSIGHT , supra note 62. That criticism does
not impugn however, the underlying observations of extreme price disparities for some retail drug
purchases.
84
Although there is some disagreement as to the particulars, depending on sample sets,
generic prices appear roughly competitive on both sides of the border. Compare Danzon & Furukawa,
supra note 12, at 525-526 (observing slightly lower Canadian prices for generics across data set); with
OFFICE OF PLANNING, supra note 64
85
See Danzon & Furukawa, supra note 12, at 526.
86
That is, differential are not completely explained by differences in wealth and costs. See
Danzon & Furukawa, supra note 12, at 527-530. Neither do we observe Ramsey discrimination
within our borders, as demand is partitioned not just according to ability/willingness to pay, but
according to regulation and varying degrees of market power to which consumers may be assigned by,
among other things, public and private accident. For a brief summary of the notion of Ramsey price
discrimination, see supra note 61.
87
See supra note 61.
88
Within the EU, price discrimination is further complicated by provisions for parallel trade
amongst member states. See, e.g., Catriona Hatton and Wim Nauwelaerts, Parallel Justice?, Pharma
Times 54-55 (Mar. 2004) (regarding policy issues behind Bayer-Adelat case) at
www.pharmatimes.com. Although manufacturers may exert downstream control via, e.g., contractual
provisions, the trade suspension of the regulatory borders between member states renders the
partitions requisite for price discrimination all the more porous. Moreover, the extent to which the EU
will permit such downstream controls remains unsettled. See Catriona Hatton and Wim Nauwelaerts,
European Court Opens a Small Window of Opportunity for Pharmaceutical Companies to Restrict
Parallel Imports of Medicines, European Pharmaceutical Contractor 30-31 (Aug. 1, 2004), available
at
http://www.hhlaw.com/files/Publication/937ed0df-08d0-4722-9cae-
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extent we consider Ramsey pricing a normative baseline for appropriate cross-border
price differentials, this is, at least, prima facie ground for questioning the IP-pricetrade-regulation structure that allows the differentials we do observe, both as they
bear on U.S. pricing and as they may raise questions of foreign free-riding on U.S.
research and development expenditures.
III. ERASING THE DOTTED LINE: WHAT WILL (LIKELY) HAPPEN TO
PRICE AND SUPPLY IF IMPEDIMENTS TO TRADE ARE LIFTED?
The prohibition in federal law notwithstanding, the importation—or
smuggling—of prescription drugs is ongoing. Private citizens have had access to
Canadian pharmacies on an ad hoc basis, and additional importation has taken place
in response to various State initiatives.89 Although enrollment in many State
sponsored plans has been considerably smaller than projected by the States
themselves, it has been substantial nonetheless.90 We should distinguish, however,
two questions. First, is the question whether some U.S. citizens may, in the short
run, take advantage of cross-border price disparities. Second, is the question
whether lifting a ban on re-importation from Canada holds promise as a means of
substantially reducing U.S. drug expenditures. That we may answer the first
question in the affirmative says relatively little about how we should answer the
second.91
With regard to the second question, I suggest that it is implausible to think that
access to the Canadian market holds much promise, in part because Canada’s market
is considerably smaller than the U.S. market and in part because lifting the
regulatory barrier to parallel trade is inadequate to guarantee free access to that
market, small or not.92 To suppose otherwise is to suppose (a) that U.S.
manufacturers will take no lawful steps to protect their revenue streams; (b) that the
Canadian government will take no lawful steps to protect its access to
pharmaceuticals; and (c) that Canadian citizens will not themselves compete on price
on the remainder. Each of these suppositions is implausible on its face.
U.S. manufacturers have various lawful means at their disposal should they wish
to block—or manage—parallel trade in pharmaceuticals. Note, first, that there is no
reason to expect that U.S. firms (and international firms in the U.S. market) will
undercut their own market positions by tailoring their exports to suit cross-border
arbitrage.93 Present export levels thus constitute a theoretical upper bound on
914d168747b8/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/1429ab35-1c2b-440f-a59adef47e41c464/1701_EPC_Summer_2004_p30-31.pdf.
89
See, e.g., S.B. 410, §§ 36-43 (Tex. 2005); Belluck, supra note 2 (regarding private sub rosa
importation); Kaufman, supra note 2 (regarding a State government engineered importation scheme);
National Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 3 (regarding National Conference of State
Legislatures summary).
90
See Illinois Seeking More Prescription Imports, VT . GUARDIAN, Aug. 5, 2005, at x,
available at http://www.i-saverx.net/assetsrx/080505_vermont.pdf. (fewer than 15,000 consumers
registered across five states); Just How Does Governor Define Success in State’s Program to Import
Prescription Drugs?, HERALD & REVIEW (Decatur), Oct. 18, 2005, at x, available at
http://www.herald-review.com/articles/2005/10/19/news/editorials/1010687.txt
(roughly
14,000
prescriptions filled for roughly 27 million eligible persons in five states).
91
And, as remarked above, brackets the question whether we should wish to import foreign
pricing schemes. See supra text accompanying notes 59-61.
92
For a brief catalogue of the limitations of parallel trade, as a means of price control, see
CONG . B UDGET OFFICE, supra note 26, at 4-5.
93
See id. at 5 (regarding various manufacturer responses); Ceci Connolly, Pfizer Cuts
Supplies to Canadian Drugstores; Sales are Halted to Reimporters of Bargain Drugs, WASH. P OST ,
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potential re-importation, and an implausibly high one at that. Independent of
contractual obligations to particular Canadian buyers, U.S. firms are under no
special obligation to maintain exports to Canada at current levels.94 U.S. firms may
also, by contract, establish downstream controls on distribution in excess of those
currently employed.95 In fact, such strategies may be applied wholesale or
piecemeal; and it appears that each has been employed to some extent to manage
arbitrage under the present legal regime.96
Second, Canada has various lawful means at its disposal for blocking—or
managing—arbitrage that undercuts the supply of pharmaceuticals in Canadian
markets. Public and private buyers in Canada may negotiate their own contractual
protections, especially as such protections may be advantageous to both upstream
and downstream parties in the chain of distribution. In addition, just as Canada
benefits from impediments to parallel trade established, at the border, in U.S. law, so
Canada may seek to establish its own statutory impediments to exportation. In fact,
the Canadian Parliament has been contemplating legislation to do precisely that,
blocking the bulk exportation of U.S.-manufactured pharmaceuticals back into the
U.S.97 Such legislation does not obviously run afoul of anti-dumping or
countervailing duties obligations, as it confers no special advantage on Canadian
manufacturers nor any special burden on the U.S. manufacturers whose production is
at issue.98
Perhaps it is not surprising, then, that bulk re-importers have already begun to
look further afield for their supply of low-cost pharmaceuticals. I-SaveRx, the
Illinois sponsored re-importation to which several states have sought access, has
already begun to look to Australian and New Zealand drug distributors to meet the
demand for low cost pharmaceuticals, despite the nascent state of re-importation and
the fact that participation has lagged behind early projections by a considerable
margin.99 Indeed, I-SaveRx appears to be seeking still wider channels of supply, as

Feb. 19, 2004, at A10 (preliminary cutbacks by one major pharmaceutical manufacturer); Merck Shuts
Off Canadian Pharmacies Selling to U.S., BLOOMBERG NEWS, Jan. 19, 2005,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000082&sid=ai9RdezyHWRE&refer=canada
(regarding cutbacks by Merck, Pfizer Inc., AstraZeneca Plc, and Wyeth).
94
See Connolly, supra note 93; Merck Shuts Off Canadian Pharmacies Selling to U.S., supra
note 93.
95
See C ONG. B UDGET OFFICE, supra note 26, at 5.
96
See supra notes 90-91.
97
See, e.g., Reuters, supra note 9 (regarding legislative controls being suggested by Canada’s
Health Minister).
98
See World Trade Org., Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/19-adp.pdf
(regarding anti-dumping provisions); World Trade Org., Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures, http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/24-scm.pdf.
99
As of October 2005, the I-SaveRx web site reports sourcing in Canada, Ireland, and the
U.K., while reporting separate Illinois feasibility studies regarding Canada, Australia/New Zealand,
and the E.U. See Welcome to I-SaveRx, http://www.i-saverx.net/ (last visited May 9, 2005). Illinois
has announced that it intends to add Australia and New Zealand sourced drugs to the I-SaveRx
program. See Press Release, The Democratic Party of Wisconsin, Governor Doyle, Illinois Governer
Blagojevich, and Illinois Congressman Emmanuel Announce Expansion of I-SaveRx Prescription
Drug Program (July 18, 2005), available at http://www.i-saverx.net/assetsrx/071905_dpw.pdf (report
issued by Democratic Party of Wisconsin). Such broad sourcing has been sought despite the fact that,
across five states, only about 14,000 consumers have even registered for the program. See Illinois
Seeking More Prescription Imports, supra note 90.
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at least one of its major sources of imports, CanaRx, has raised the topic of Indian
sourcing of pharmaceuticals.100
Finally, should Canadian supply dwindle significantly, we might expect a nontrivial number of Canadians to compete with re-importers on price. Despite
considerable public support for medical services in Canada, there is, already,
substantial access to other segments of the U.S. healthcare market by Canadian
citizens, the majority of whom live a relatively short distance from the U.S. border.
It is an empirical question whether true open-market prices across the U.S./Canada
border would be significantly lower if that market could somehow be accomplished;
and despite lower per-capita GDP in Canada,101 it is not analytically false that they
might be slightly higher.
Hence, we ought not to be surprised that the Congressional Budget Office has
predicted that full-scale, lawful re-importation would make only a “negligible”
impact on U.S. prescription drug prices.102 That is, a negligible impact independent
of its regulatory burden. I shall argue below that the burden is more substantial than
it might appear.
IV. OPEN BORDERS AND THE COST OF FREE TRADE
The main argument of this paper comes in two parts. I have argued that
Canadian re-importation is inadequate as a means of controlling the price of
prescription drugs in the U.S. That is partly to do with the fact that Canada has a
much smaller pharmaceuticals market than we do and partly to do with the fact that
re-importation is, qua price regulation, baroque and fragile.103 Second, I shall argue
that the benefits of parallel trade in pharmaceuticals—such as they may be—are not
to be had for free. There are real regulatory burdens implied by parallel trade,
burdens that do not carry their own weight if the benefits are likely slight and
transitory. Central to this second argument is the notion that the pharmaceuticals
market wants regulation; that is, the pharmaceuticals market has all the earmarks of
classic, Coasian market failure and, as such, ought to be subject to the sort of
comprehensive regulatory scheme to which it is, in fact, subject.104
That the market is subject to such regulation on both sides of the border raises,
but does not answer, the question what sorts of regulatory similarity are adequate to
what purposes. If our purpose is to maintain regulatory integrity as products travel
in international commerce, we must ask about the particular regulatory burdens
imposed by trade across borders, as adequate local regimes may not be mutually
transparent and as there may be a sort of regulatory gap between jurisdictions,
despite adequate compliance within them.105 Importation and exportation may thus
100
FDA Seizes Drugs Imported Under States’ Program, Supplier Says, BLOOMBERG NEWS,
Mar.
9,
2005,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000082&sid=atBleFFijT6E&refer=canada#.
101
For a summary comparison of economic indicators, including relative wealth, see
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC C O-OPERATION & DEVELOPMENT , OECD IN F IGURES 12-13 (Supp.
2005), available at http://213.253.134.29/oecd/pdfs/browseit/0105061E.PDF.
102
CONG . B UDGET OFFICE, supra note 26, at 5.
103
As above, this observation holds independent of the extent to which such controls may be
otherwise undesirable.
104
See generally Coase, supra note 25 (regarding social costs amenable to administrative
management).
105
The gap may be observed at various levels of regulation and compliance. For example, just
as the administrative burdens of regulating foreign distributors may seem daunting to FDA, especially
as we consider greatly expanding the pool of such distributors, so may the burdens of regulating
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involve costs above and beyond those of transportation itself. We need to know
what those costs are and who is likely to bear them. Finally, we may be concerned
about ersatz parallel trade; that is, we may wonder about the extent to which we
foster or subsidize less desirable substitute trade channels when we multiply lawful
ones.
A. THE ARGUMENT FOR REGULATION, IN BRIEF
I am unaware of popular arguments against the regulation of pharmaceuticals
and, in particular, biotech products. It is true that arguments against regulation
generally have had some purchase.106 Still, such broad arguments do not come from
dominant views of administrative governance. More to the point, there seems not to
have been much serious discussion in the U.S., Canada, or the E.U., of the notion
that drug products are especially bad candidates for safety regulation or especially
good candidates for purely private controls, or perhaps purely private controls
augmented by the tort system.107 To the contrary, if we bracket advocacy of parallel
trade, popular and academic concerns about pharmaceuticals regulation appear most
commonly directed at inadequate consumer protection, not excessive regulation.108
Re-importation advocacy, however, typically involves some sort of notion that a
particular regulatory regime might be just as well suspended. Hence, consumers (a)
ought to be able to choose amongst competing regulatory regimes as they might
choose amongst competing brands, (b) ought to be able to choose amongst
“equivalent” regulatory regimes, or (c) ought to be able to opt out of regulation, at
least for certain purposes. If our central concern about drugs is price, we might well
seek substitute channels of supply, just as we might seek substitute products.
Alternative regulatory regimes can be construed as describing yet another vector
along which consumers may differentiate competing products. With or without
incorporating that vector, the market may perceive competing products as more-orless close substitutes. Perhaps, however, we ought to be chary of suggestions that
we suspend regulatory efforts in this particular case and careful, at least, in how we
frame the issue of regulatory substitution.
In his seminal work on “those actions of business firms which have harmful
effects on others,” R.H. Coase considered generally the circumstances under which
third-party effects may best be handled by market transactions on the one hand or

exportation be seen as daunting by the Canadian government if they are to regard retail outlets at
various scales as potential exporters. In fact, Health Canada has declined to assure the integrity of
such expanded exports as a matter of its own enforcement discretion—it wishes to distribute its
limited compliance resources otherwise. See, e.g., citing Health Canada, Letter from Diane C.
Gorman, Assistant Deputy Minister, to Richard H. Carmona, Surgeon General of the U.S. Public
Health Service (Jun. 1, 2004) available at http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/04n0115/04N0115_emc-000018-01.pdf.
106
Less ambitiously, anyone might sensibly question the efficiency of particular regulatory
endeavors. Coase himself was acutely aware of the possibility of regulatory inefficiency or failure.
See generally Coase, supra note 25.
107
See Elias Mossialos et al., World Health Organization, Regulating Pharmaceuticals in
Europe: An Overview, in R EGULATING P HARMACEUTICALS IN EUROPE: S TRIVING FOR EFFICIENCY,
EQUITY , AND QUALITY 2 (Elias Mossialos et al. eds. 2004) (“The pharmaceutical market is unique
with regard to the extent and depth of its failure to meet the criteria for a perfect market.”).
Arguments on behalf of common law controls most typically advocate the importance of state tort law
as an adjunct to federal regulation, not as its replacement. See, e.g., Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories,
625 A.2d 1066, 1079 (N.J. 1993).
108
Qualify with, e.g., patient advocacy groups concerned with access.
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various administrative arrangements on the other.109 When the cost of the harm is
clear and the pricing system works smoothly (that is, strictly speaking, when
transaction costs are zero), the optimal allocation of resources will occur via market
transaction independent of the initial assignment of rights.110 When, however, the
costs of transacting around the harms are significant, an administrative solution may
be most efficient.111 The administrative solution is most likely to be efficient in
circumstances in which the costs of contracting are especially high.112 Those are, for
example, where material contingencies are especially numerous and diverse and
where especially long-term contracts are required to address potential harms.113
Administrative functions may often, of course, be implemented within a firm, but
where we seek to administrate over highly complex or diverse effects that are liable
to be felt by very large numbers of persons, regulation within a firm may be
intractable and government regulation may be preferable.114 Indeed, we might add
that, just as long term effects might militate in favor of administrative solutions
generally, so especially long term effects might militate in favor of government
regulation in particular, as intra-firm (and capital markets) discount rates may often
be higher than public ones.115
Coase provides an example of environmental pollution as suggesting
administrative solution via government intervention: “In the standard case of a
smoke nuisance, which may affect a vast number of people engaged in a wide
variety of activities, the administrative costs might well be so high as to make any
attempt to deal with the problem within the confines of a single firm impossible.”116
Indeed, the possible harms of pharmaceuticals and the contingencies under which
they may arise provide an equally good example, if not a better one.117 Of course
109
See Coase, supra note 25. Coase provides a useful, general approach that is applicable to
our market or domain; other rationales for regulatory intervention are consistent with it, certainly so
with regard to our application. E.g. RICHARD P OSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, 383-385 (6th
ed. 2003) (regarding “optimal regulation”).
110
See Coase, supra note 25, at 15. That does not, of course, mean that there are no
distributional consequences to the choice of initial allocation or that such consequences—and
threshold effects—are not legitimate areas of social concern. Steven Cheung has defined “transaction
costs” broadly, as “all those costs that cannot be conceived to exist in a Robinson Crusoe (one-man)
economy.” Steven N.S. Cheung, On the New Institutional Economics, in C ONTRACT ECONOMICS 48,
51 (Lars Werin & Hans Wijkander eds., 1992).
111
See Coase, supra note 25, at 16.
112
Id. at 16-17.
113
Id.
114
See id. at 17. Significant attention has been paid to the notion that problems of
administration at the level of the firm may be observed in government administration too; Coase
himself referred to the government as a “super firm.” Cheung, supra note 110, at 57.
115
See Coase, supra note 25, at 17. C.f. P OSNER , supra note 109, at 385 (regarding regulatory
intervention for causes of fatal injuries); O FFICE OF MGMT . & BUDGET , EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF F EDERAL REGULATIONS UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12866 (Jan.
11, 1996), http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/riaguide.html (regarding intervention in cases of
market failure, such as involving externalities, natural monopoly, market power, and inadequate or
asymmetric information).
116
Coase, supra note 25, at 17. None of this should be taken to suggest that Coase was
insensitive to the costs of government regulation or the possibility of its failure to provide an efficient
result. C.f. OFFICE OF MGMT. & B UDGET , supra note 116 (regarding alternatives to federal
regulation).
117
See, e.g., Mossialos et al., supra note 107, at 2 (“The pharmaceutical market is unique with
regard to the extent and depth of its failure to meet the criteria for a perfect market.”); WORLD
HEALTH ORG ., THE WORLD MEDICINES S ITUATION 75 (2004) (“Worldwide, it is estimated that half of
all medicines are inappropriately prescribed, dispensed, or sold, and that half of all patients fail to
take their medicines properly.”).
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pharmaceuticals are therapeutically useful—often critically so—but their benefits do
not come risk-free.118 It is easy enough to point to ad hoc examples of the dangers
medications may present. In the limit, drug products may be fatal to their
consumers, and such fatal adverse events are a significant cause of death.119 Short of
that, drugs may cause serious trauma, e.g., in the form of cardiac arrest, internal
bleeding, organ damage, or serious teratogenic effects if consumed by pregnant
women; and such effects may be distributed variously across large populations and
time.120
FDA has expressed concern that parallel trade might facilitate trade in (and
consumption of) counterfeit and otherwise substandard pharmaceuticals and has
discovered numerous examples of such products among re-imports, both real and
fake.121 Such products may be dangerous insofar as they are toxic or susceptible to
unanticipated drug interactions; and, plainly, they may also do harm if they deprive a
patient of an anticipated and otherwise deliverable therapeutic benefit. Such
concerns are not parochial to FDA or to the U.S.—the WHO, for example, considers
trade in counterfeit drugs to be a burgeoning problem as, apparently, does the EU.122
Setting aside concerns that parallel trade may decrease the integrity of the U.S.
drug supply does not eliminate the problem, because therapeutic drugs in general—
approved, conforming therapeutic drugs that are properly prescribed and
administered—are inherently risky and potentially dangerous.123 Hence we observe,
for example, standard regulated labeling regarding “contraindications,” “warnings,”
“precautions,” and “adverse events,” for approved drug products.124 Such labeling
devices represent, among other things, risk management tools.125 In their particulars,
118
See generally C TR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH , U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVICES, 2001 R EPORT TO THE NATION 25-28 (2002), available at
http://www.fda.gov/cder/reports/rtn/2001/rtn2001-3.htm.
119
See id.
120
A given drug product may present diverse risks. For example, FDA’s Patient Information
Sheet for Isotretinoin (a drug product indicated for the treatment of severe acne) warns against any use
during pregnancy, as risks include birth defects, miscarriage, premature birth, and infant death; risks
for the population more generally include, but are not limited to, serious mental health problems,
serious brain problems, damage to internal organs, and death. U.S. F OOD & DRUG ADMINISTRATION ,
PATIENT INFORMATION SHEET: ISOTRETINOIN (MARKETED AS ACCUTANE ) (Nov. 2005), available at
http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/InfoSheets/patient/isotretinoinPIS.pdf.
121
See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Administration, Recent FDA/U.S. Customs
Import Blitz Exams Continue to Reveal Potentially Dangerous Illegally Imported Drug Shipments
(Jan. 27, 2004) (regarding variously nonconforming drugs seized at import mail facilities and courier
hubs).
122
See, e.g., U.K. DEPT . OF HEALTH , EU HEADS OF MEDICINES AGENCIES (HUMAN &
MEETING
(2005),
available
at
VETERINARY )
http://www.dh.gov.uk/PolicyAndGuidance/International/EuropeanUnion/EUPresidency2005/EUPresid
encyArticle/fs/en?CONTENT_ID=4117909&chk=aSYUR8; WORLD HEALTH ORG ., F ACT S HEET NO .
MEDICINES
(Feb.
2006),
available
at
275,
COUNTERFEIT
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs275/en/print.html; Reuters, Fake Drugs Spreading
Rapidly, Warns WHO, MSNBC, May 6, 2005, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/776125
(focusing on counterfeit drugs in Asia and developing countries).
123
See generally C TR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & R ESEARCH , supra note 119.
124
See 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(d)-(g) (2005) (regulations regarding “contraindications,”
“warnings,” “precautions,” and “adverse events,” respectively); 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(f)(6) (2005)
(regarding categories of teratogenic precautions).
125
See, e.g., C TR. FOR B IOLOGICS EVALUATION & R ESEARCH , U.S. DEPT . OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVICES, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY : DEVELOPMENT AND USE OF RISK MINIMIZATION
ACTION P LANS (2005), available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/guidance/6358fnl.pdf (regarding
appropriate and updated labeling, among other action plans and including labels, practitioner letters,
and patient medication guides among RiskMAP tools).
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they, like product approvals, are part of what establish any given product as moreor-less safe or effective, for certain indications, in a given population.126 In their
particulars, they may vary across regulatory regimes in ways that matter to the
public health, even if both (or all) the regimes in question are, generally speaking,
defensible as adequate. In addition, post-marketing scrutiny of drug safety is
common across mature regulatory regimes—we impose information gathering,
record-keeping, and reporting requirements on all prescription drugs because even
substantial and prolonged clinical testing cannot be presumed definitive indicators of
a drug’s risks.127 In the U.S., all pharmaceutical and biological manufacturers are
subject to adverse event reporting regulations, which require the reporting of adverse
events generally and the prompt reporting of certain serious adverse events.128 For
some products, systematic post-approval (Phase 4) testing may also be required.129
Canada, the EU, and the ICH have developed analogous standards for much the
same reasons.130
Competition itself can serve as a risk management tool, but perfect competition
is elusive—in relevant regards, perhaps especially so in an industry such as this.
Perfect competition requires: (a) indefinitely many buyers and sellers, each of which
takes price and cost as a given;131 (b) a consistent, or homogeneous, product across
producers;132 (c) perfect information on the parts of buyers and sellers;133 (d) free
entry;134 and (e) no third-party effects—or externalities—generated by either the
production or acquisition of goods.135 All of these criteria fail to obtain in
pharmaceuticals markets. For any given category of product, sellers may be few or
one.136 Some degree of product differentiation may be the norm—certainly so in
126

See supra text accompanying notes 103-108.
See CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, supra note 119, at 25 (“The practical size
of premarketing clinical trials means that we cannot learn everything about the safety of a drug before
we approve it. Therefore, a degree of uncertainty always exists about the risks of drugs.”)
128
See 21 C.F.R § 314.80 (2005) and 21 C.F.R § 600.80 (2005) (regulations regarding postmarketing reporting of adverse events for drugs and biological products, respectively); adverse events
that are both “serious and unexpected” are subject to 15-day “Alert reports” requirements under 21
C.F.R § 314.80(c)(1)(i) (2005) and follow-up reporting requirements under 21 § C.F.R
314.80(c)(1)(ii) (2005). Biologics manufacturers are subject to analogous requirements for “Alert
reports” and follow-ups under 21 C.F.R § 600.80(c)(1)(i)-(ii) (2005); Expedited Safety Reporting
Requirements for Human Drug and Biological Products, 62 Fed. Reg. 52237 (Oct. 7, 1997) (to be
codified at 21 C.F.R pt. 20, 310, 312, 314, and 600).
129
See 21 C.F.R § 312.85 (2005) (regarding post-marketing “phase 4” studies).
130
In Europe, pharmacovigilence is required of marketing authorization holders and the
competent authorities of the member states under Council Regulation 2309/93, art. 19-26, 1993 O.J.
(L 214) (EC);
Council Directive 2001/83, 2001 O.J. (L 311) (EC), available at
http://www.eudravigilance.org/human/docs/Directives/Consolidated2001-83EN.pdf; and Commission
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540/95,
1995
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55)
(EC),
available
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EMEA
implemented
“EudraVigilance,” an adverse event database, in 2001. Information on, and links to, the system, may
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See id. at 6.
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See id. at 7-8.
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patent-protected products but also across a broad selection of non-exclusive or
generic ones.137 Barriers to entry, including regulatory barriers, are substantial in
both the U.S. and Canada.138 Information is inevitably incomplete and may be
staggeringly so, while information asymmetries ranging across buyers and sellers are
liable to be spectacular. Drug quality is not generally subject to easy inspection by
consumers, and both anticipated benefits and possible harms may be expressed
clearly, subtly, or stochastically, and may be evident—if at all—in the short,
intermediate, or long run. Third-party effects may be substantial—trivially so with
regard to the public health effects of untreated or mistreated infectious diseases and
the teratogenic or heritable effects of certain therapies or the conditions those
therapies might treat. All of these possibilities militate against easy and inexpensive
contract formation and in favor of administrative solutions.
None of this is news. Public understanding of the range of possible risks and
benefits may be variable or often incorrect, in pharmaceuticals as elsewhere. Still,
possible side-effects are conspicuous in direct-to-consumer advertising, and labeling
aimed at patients and prescribing physicians, and certain adverse events have
received considerable public attention. Within regulatory circles, both general
notions of drug risks and the particular mechanisms used to detect, evaluate, and
report them have received much attention. The point of reviewing these issues here
is simply to highlight the extent to which a presumption of regulatory needs ought to
permeate any discussion of parallel trade. That such needs have gotten such short
shrift in the discussion is at least surprising.
Of course one might be concerned about the costs of regulation as well, but
there are reasons to think that the domain of pharmaceuticals is as well suited to
regulation as a large market can be. FDA’s statutory authority regards risky
products, risks which are extremely variable across a very large portion of the
population. That authority involves a highly technical subject matter subject to
inevitable uncertainties. FDA’s centers and offices face clear technical and
disciplinary demands—demands which, I suggest, are at least roughly satisfied by
FDA’s architecture and staff.139 That is, there is a proper technical subject matter
about which the administrative agency may acquire substantial expertise and the

scheme imposed on drug development. See Pub. L. 97-414 (Jan. 4, 1983) (Congressional Findings for
the Orphan Drug Act). The Act's implementing regulations require the drug's sponsor to demonstrate,
e.g., that "there is no reasonable expectation" that drug sales will offset development costs or that the
target market for the drug is less than 200,000 persons. See 21 C.F.R. §316.21 (2006).
137
Louis Phlips, among others, makes this point about products more generally. See LOUIS
PHLIPS, THE ECONOMICS OF PRICE DISCRIMINATION 1 (1983) (typical firms have some degree of
market power).
For a pharmaceutical example, we might consider that, although patent protection
continues for certain formulations of Prozac (e.g., Patent Number 5910319, Capsule, Delayed Release
Pellets), exclusivity regarding the active moiety itself, as indicated for the treatment of depression, has
expired. Numerous generic manufacturers have thus entered the market for this popular drug. At the
time of this writing, FDA’s listing of Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence
Evaluations (Electronic Orange Book), current through June 2005, lists more than 22 manufacturers of
more than 60 formulations of fluoxetine hydrochloride. U.S. Food & Drug Administration, Electronic
Orange Book (2005), http://www.fda.gov/cder/ob/default.htm .
138
The requirements of marketing approval alone are among the most stringent in all of
administrative law. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 314 (2005)(U.S. regulations regarding applications to FDA
for approval to market a new drug); Food and Drug Regulations (Food and Drugs Act), C.R.C.
C.08.002 (regulations regarding sale or advertising of new drugs in Canada).
139
Lars Noah, Rewarding Regulatory Compliance: the Pursuit of Symmetry in Products
Liability, 88 GEO . L.J. 2147, 2153-57 (2000) (regarding agency as expert authority).
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agency has, in fact, acquired such expertise.140 No private firm, nor any of the
several States, has done anything comparable.
Thus, we have a brief argument for the typically non-controversial position that
serious regulation—a comprehensive regulatory scheme—is critical to the proper
functioning of markets in pharmaceuticals and, not incidentally, public health.
Introducing additional types of systematic error into consumer decision-making, or
exacerbating existing ones, might subject millions or tens of millions of persons to
harm. The general question whether free trade in pharmaceuticals is liable to
enhance or confound the relevant regulatory task is not, from the U.S. perspective,
substantially more difficult. The large majority of the world’s nations lack any
effective pharmaceuticals regulation and if drug counterfeiting is a problem globally,
it is a special problem in Asia, where at least two nations possess both problematic
IP regimes and significant manufacturing capacity;141 correspondingly, they have
been identified as active producers and substantial exporters of counterfeit drug
products.142 Any under-regulated nation might be a source of counterfeit or
otherwise substandard medicines; certainly, many have been.143
Parallel trade amongst nations that possess substantial regulatory regimes poses
a smaller, but overlapping, set of problems. The stock of approved products may
vary across borders—as it varies across the U.S./Canada border—and similar
products may present differences in labeling, packaging, or dosage that have
regulatory (and safety) significance on either side of the border. Enforcement
provisions or priorities may vary across borders, too, in ways relevant to a nation’s
applied risk/benefit analysis.144 And additional channels of bona fide trade may
foster additional opportunities for mistake or fraud. For example, State-endorsed
importation web sites may themselves be sources of non-complying products—say,
due to flaws in the chain of distribution or mistakes about purported product
140
See id. Of course, this is not to say that the Agency’s particular decisions have been
universally correct or uncontroversial, and recent years have seen FDA at the center of various
political and technical controversies.
141
See, e.g., Alan R. Spies et al., Counterfeit Drugs: A Menace Keeps Growing, 28 U.S.
PHARMACIST ,
Jan.
15,
2003,
at
x,
available
at
http://www.uspharmacist.com/index.asp?show=article&page=8_1014.htm (regarding counterfeiting
and IP limitations in India and elsewhere); Peggy B. Hu & Berta Gomez, Public Safety Jeopardized by
Chinese Counterfeiters, Experts Say, U.S. DEPT . OF STATE, INTERNATIONAL INFORMATIONS
PROGRAMS, May 20, 2005, http://usinfo.state.gov/eap/Archive/2005/May/20-45620.html.
142
See, e.g., WORLD HEALTH ORG ., THE WORLD MEDICINES S ITUATION 93, 98 (2004),
available at http://w3.whosea.org/LinkFiles/Reports_World_Medicines_Situation.pdf (“Fewer than
one in six WHO62 Member States have well-developed drug regulation and two in six have no or very
little drug regulatory capacity.”)
143
Among others, Mexico, India, and China have been substantial sources of non-conforming
prescription drugs imported into the U.S. See, e.g., Spies et al., supra note 142 (discussing
counterfeiting around the globe).
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See. e.g., WORLD HEALTH ORG , supra note 142, at 99 (differential regulations regarding
exports and “pass through” drugs in developed countries, including Germany, Netherlands, Sweden,
Finland, and Switzerland); From Test Tube to Patient, Imported Drugs Raise Safety Concerns, FDA
CONSUMER ,
Jan.
2006,
at
x,
available
at
http://www.fda.gov/fdac/special/testtubetopatient/imports.html (issues with Canadian importation);
U.S. DEPT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN S ERVICES TASK F ORCE ON DRUG IMPORTATION, R EPORT ON
PRESCRIPTION
DRUG
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60-61
(2004),
available
at
http://www.hhs.gov/importtaskforce/Report1220.pdf (most countries impose lesser regulations on
drugs intended for export and do not regulate drugs merely transshipped through their countries; most
countries do not commit adequate resources to assure safety of exports). Canada, in particular is
unprepared to assure integrity of exports to U.S. Id. at 62 (citing Letter from Diane C. Gorman,
Assistant Deputy Minister, Health Canada, to Richard H. Carmona, Surgeon General, U.S. Public
Health Service, (Jun. 1, 2004)).
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origins—and they may, by their very existence, enhance consumer access to
competing sites, located either in the regulated trade partner nation itself or
elsewhere.145 Hence, the existence and publication of State-sponsored importation
requires that we ask how to regulate intended new channels of trade, but also how
we regulate ersatz channels that may be mistaken for the intended ones. At the least,
parallel trade suggests an added regulatory burden, as adequately regulated
importation and exportation imply compliance burdens for sellers and regulators.
Such burdens are liable to be most substantial in precisely the contemplated case;
that is, when the trade one wishes to foster is a fluid market in arbitrage.146
Trade with Canada, on this account, imposes a regulatory burden even if we
suppose that Canada is, for the U.S., a best-case trade partner, one with a regulatory
regime that is, from our perspective, both substantial and familiar. Preliminary
experience garnered by FDA suggests that the various potential problems with
Canada-sourced pharmaceuticals are, even under the current legal regime, to some
extent actual: Agency-sponsored enforcement efforts at the border have uncovered,
among other things, misbranded products, adulterated products, and outright
counterfeits, both from sources actually within Canada and from, e.g., Asian sources
purporting to be Canadian.147 That is not to say that the regulatory burden is in all
regards intractable, merely that it is substantial and needs to be accounted for in any
evaluation of the costs and benefits of parallel trade. If the benefits are few, or
transitory, the costs are not likely worth paying.
B. CONSTRAINTS ALL THE WAY DOWN: WHAT MIGHT REGULATORY EQUIVALENCE
LOOK LIKE ANYWAY?
If we were to shop around for regulatory brands, what would our shopping look
like? If we were to shop only amongst equivalent regulatory regimes, how would
we conceive and establish equivalence? The States that have considered and/or
implemented schemes for Canadian-sourced re-importation have viewed such
questions with varying degrees of scrutiny or interest. At one end of the spectrum,
we may identify hastily-drafted legislation that appears to do little more than bundle
the twin burdens of considering and implementing regulatory adequacy, assigning
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See, e.g., Examining the Implications of Drug Importation: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of William K. Hubbard, Assoc. Commissioner for
Pol’y
and
Planning,
U.S.
Food
and
Drug
Admin.),
available
at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=1264&wit_id=3700 (regarding internet and other
importation problems, including regulatory and safety failings of State-sponsored importation
programs).
146
Hence we might wish to subject to U.S. registration requirements and oversight not just a
relatively small number of Canadian manufacturers, or large-scale distributors, but a very large
number of smaller distributors and even retail outlets. We might wish to do so, the better to secure an
adequate stock of arbitrageurs, but we might blanch at the cost.
147
See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Recent FDA/U.S. Customs
Import Blitz Exams Continue to Reveal Potentially Dangerous Illegally Imported Drug Shipments
(Jan. 27, 2004), available at http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/2004/NEW01011.html (regarding
variously nonconforming drugs seized at import mail facilities and courier hubs); Press Release, U.S.
Food and Drug Administration, FDA Test Results of Prescription Drugs from Bogus Canadian
Website Show All Products are Fake and Substandard (Jul. 13, 2004), available at
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/news/2004/NEW01087.html; Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Investigations of the S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 108th Cong. (Jul. 22, 2004) (statement of
John M. Taylor, III, Associate Commissioner for Regulatory Affairs, U.S. Food and Drug
Administration), available at http://www.fda.gov/ola/2004/importeddrugs0722.html.
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both, simultaneously, to State pharmacy regulators.148 At the other end, perhaps, we
may consider the feasibility studies undertaken by the State of Illinois prior to
implementing its I-SaveRx program.149 Those studies, and the program they purport
to justify, have been adopted as models by several other states. Indeed, Wisconsin,
Missouri, Kansas, and Vermont, have elected simply to join the Illinois importation
program rather than develop their own.150
The Illinois studies are striking both for what they attempt and for what they do
not. On the one hand, the studies contemplate questions of regulatory similarity for
both pharmaceutical products and pharmacies, considering statutory frameworks,
parallels at the level of regulatory implementation, and staffing.151 At the same time,
the “research method and design” of the Illinois study is, qua methodology, nearly
impenetrable. The section on “consumer safety,” for example, “looks at the many
issues surrounding patient safety … [comparing] procedures for the manufacture,
storage, and dispensing of pharmaceuticals.”152 But neither the methods section nor
the chapter regarding consumer safety appears to describe any technical standards
for measuring consumer safety or establishing equivalence on any particular
conception of equivalence.153 Regulatory provisions are compared and contrasted.154
Pharmacies and distributors (at least several) are visited. 155 A conclusion is reached:
“While there are differences in the details of how the pharmacy profession is
regulated, the standards of protecting the public health and safety are substantially
equivalent.”156
The rationale for any particular conclusion is, however, left utterly mysterious,
as is the question, which, if any, measurements were taken based on such a rationale.
Similarly unclear is what Illinois intends to do by way of ongoing regulation, either
on its own behalf or on behalf of other states participating in its program. Certain
State pharmacy regulations are said to apply, but whether or how such application is
supposed to do proxy duty for FDA’s regulatory and compliance obligation is
unspecified. My own suspicion is that Illinois simply lacks the requisite resources,
human and otherwise, to do the job. I want to suggest that this is a non-trivial
question of institutional competence with regard to regulatory tasks that have never
been handled by the States. Contract and reputational constraints may serve as de
facto regulation in the breach, but if we were persuaded by the importance of public
administrative solutions for this domain of commerce generally, we may be
concerned to see private substitutes adopted on the basis of so little experience,
analysis and oversight.157
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See, e.g., S.B. 410, §§ 36-43, Leg., 79th Sess. (Tex. 2005).
See generally KAMATH , ET AL ., supra note 48.
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See http://www.i-saverx.net/, welcoming the states into participation in the program.
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See KAMATH , ET AL ., supra note 48, at 11-12 (providing an overview of research findings).
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See id. at 9.
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See id. at 8-10 (research method and design) and 11-18 (consumer fraud and safety).
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See id. at 16-18 (comparing Illinois pharmacy requirements with those of Ontario and
Manitoba) and 38-40 (comparing text of U.S. and Canadian regulations regarding storage and
warehousing of pharmaceuticals).
155
See id. at 8.
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See id. at 11.
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The argument is not that private incentives to self-regulation are trivial, merely that they
are not, in and of themselves, sufficient. That States would place so much faith in such a limited
number of contracts, on the basis of such limited history with the relevant parties, and in the absence
of developed, systematic private-side regulation, suggests to this observer more carelessness about
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To the extent one is shopping for comparable regulatory brands, this may be
sensible enough. An inevitably bounded comparison is carried out—certain features
are compared, certain experts are consulted, and a decision is reached.158 That
decision may contemplate the substitution of Canadian regulation (or New Zealand,
or Mexico) for FDA, just as it may contemplate the substitution of Zoloft for Prozac.
To the extent one is standing in the shoes of an actual or potential regulator of crossborder trade, however, the process is puzzling if not opaque.
Implicit in the Illinois account appears to be a notion that regulatory
comparisons need to take place at multiple levels of implementation, including the
regulations themselves, compliance staffing, and practices on the ground.159 It
seems, however, that the vast majority of the regulatory comparison regards merely
the language of the regulations themselves, as the study goes to some lengths in
juxtaposing regulatory provisions from the two systems, but does little to compare
the manner in which those provisions are implemented in fact.160 What is missing,
here, is any clear notion of which regulatory differences may be differences in
something akin to regulatory function and which may be differences in something
like the mere implementation of that function.161 Clarity on this matter would be
extremely useful—for the re-importation debate to be sure, but also for more general
discussions of international harmonization.
With regard to criminal law, it has long been considered that the law’s
disincentives to crime function at multiple levels—the law as written and the law as
enforced; categories of enforcement and likelihoods of enforcement; resources, both
human and technical, brought to bear against crime.162 With regulatory constraints
on behavior, too, anything might matter to regulation as applied—details of the
regulations themselves, regulatory guidance for industry and field personnel,
compliance staffing, scheduling, training, technological resources, procedures and
practices.
Differences of one sort or another may not be seen to matter, just as differences
of some magnitude or another may be seen as trivial. Standards may be deemed
equivalent—or close enough—on operational grounds. They may, that is, be
differences merely in the implementation of whatever regulatory function has been
deemed important. Those grounds do, however, need to be identified and defended,
if regulatory regimes are to be deemed “substantially equivalent” by something more
than executive fiat.163 But prior to identifying, and justifying, a given level of
regulatory precision, we might start with a more basic notion of equivalence: if
158
There is a burgeoning literature regarding the application of concepts of heuristics and
bounded search to legal problems. See, e.g., Owen D. Jones, The Evolution of Irrationality, 41
JURIMETRICS 289 (2001), BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass Sunstein, ed., 2000).
Empirical investigations of, e.g., bounded trust and bargaining games are discussed at Vernon Smith,
Experimental Methods in Economics, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COGNITIVE S CIENCE 2003, at 1070-79
(2003), available at http://www.neuroeconomics.net/pdf/materials/455.pdf.
159
See KAMATH, ET AL., supra note 48, at 38 (regarding Good Manufacturing Practice
regulations and quality control).
160
See id. at 40-44 and appendices A and B (comparing U.S. and Canadian regulatory
requirements for warehousing and storage of pharmaceuticals).
161
Notions of functional decomposition and implementation across multiple levels of
explanation have been explored more fully in the cognitive and biological sciences than they have in
this domain.
162
See generally Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL.
ECON . 169 (1968); ESSAYS IN THE ECONOMICS OF C RIME AND PUNISHMENT (Gary S. Becker &
Willam M. Landes, eds. 1974).
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anything might matter, then to first approximation, regulatory equivalence, like
regulatory responsibility, goes all the way to the bottom.
V. DOWN THE ROAD: TRADE, REGULATION, AND HARMONIZATION ON
A LARGER SCALE
The debate about re-importation continues apace. Within the U.S., the
prominence of Canada in the debate is something of a red herring. There are very
good legal and economic reasons why pharmaceuticals are to some extent cheaper in
Canada. We may dispute the extent to which such reasons explain or justify crossborder price disparities. We may dispute, too, the extent to which it would be in the
interest of the U.S. to approach Canadian pricing policy or price levels. We cannot,
however, think that Canada holds much promise as a supplier of pharmaceuticals
adequate in scale to substantially lower U.S. drug prices. The Canadian market, in
its present form, is simply too small to fulfill that function, and elimination of the
regulatory border from the U.S. side may very well make it smaller. We have seen
that nascent attempts by several of the States to circumvent federal authority on
importation have, already, implicated public and private steps, on both sides of the
border, to reduce cross-border pharmaceuticals arbitrage. We have seen too, that
nascent State-based re-importation schemes have already had to look further and
further abroad for sources of imports, despite the fact that only a small minority of
eligible citizens have sought to participate in those schemes.
I have argued that there is another problem with Canadian-sourced imports for
U.S. pharmaceuticals consumers, a safety problem. As FDA has pointed out,
Canadian-sourced imports have been found variously non-conforming with regard to
U.S. drug regulations; and imports purportedly sourced in Canada have been found
to come from elsewhere entirely.164 That latter fact should give us special pause,
given the large number of conspicuously inadequate regulatory regimes across the
globe.165 The issue is not that Canadian regulation of pharmaceuticals safety is, in
itself, inferior to U.S. regulation. The issues are, rather, (a) that we may fail in
several ways to reap the benefits of Canadian regulation when we seek Canadian
sources and (b) that there is an imperfect regulatory fit between the two systems. In
brief, regulatory adequacy is context sensitive, and equally defensible standards may
fail to be either commensurable or transferable across the relevant contexts. That is
a problem because this market requires regulation, and it is a problem to the extent
that this market requires regulation. To the extent that a comprehensive regulatory
scheme is critical from public and private health perspectives—critical, that is, to the
proper functioning of the pharmaceuticals market—questions about regulatory
adequacy become central in domestic health policy, and in international trade and IP
policy.166
Market, healthcare, and regulatory differences between the two nations impose
special administrative costs on both sides of the border. Differences in labeling,
packaging, dosing, and distribution do not necessarily pose intractable barriers to
trade. But if we must stand in the shoes of the pharmaceuticals regulator to make
164
See, e.g., Press Release. U.S. Food and Drug Administration, supra note 148; Press
Release, U.S. Food and Drug Administration, supra note 148. Links to these and other pages
available at http://www.fda.gov/importeddrugs (last visited Nov. 28, 2005).
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See supra text accompanying note 143 (WHO regards drug regulation as systematically
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See supra text accompanying notes 107-141.
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either market, or trade between them, function as it should, then we must account for
such differences one way or another. We need to begin with a thick, multi-layered
comparison of the two systems, identify asymmetries and gaps between them, and
decide, on some systematic grounds: which areas of concern matter (and which do
not), how much the concerns matter, and what might be done, on a cost-justified
basis, to manage them. This simply has not been done and its doing is, as I’ve
argued, unlikely to be worthwhile for either the United States or Canada.
If this is fundamentally an administrative problem, concerns about Canada may
fruitfully be considered in light of other, more systematic, attempts at regulatory
integration. Impediments to trade generally call for justification and, our concerns
about parallel trade notwithstanding, the globalization of drug development,
production, marketing, and distribution, do not obviously benefit from the variation
in regulatory schema we observe around the globe. Consumers—patients all—do
not obviously benefit from them either.167 To that end, we might consider what, e.g.,
EU harmonization may have to offer as a model of regulatory integration.
The European integration process may be the best model of a large scale,
directed program of market and regulatory integration available.168 Certainly it is
the most ambitious, ranging over diverse areas of industrial and trade policy, health
policy, and human rights in deep ways, and incorporating significant legislative,
regulatory, compliance, and judicial functions.169 EU pharmaceuticals regulation,
via Community legislation and the regulatory activities of the EMEA, is surely the
most significant program of pharmaceuticals and biologics regulatory integration
seen to date. That integration is neither seamless nor complete.170
The EU has provided, among other things, a unifying statutory framework for
medicines, a centralized regulatory agency, and a centralized approval process for
medicines.171 The EU has also provided for parallel trade, in drugs, among member
states.172 Less settled is the extent to which implementation of the European scheme
will achieve either real regulatory integration or the growth of a single European
market. Thus far, EU integration remains incomplete in several ways. That is
significant to the extent we might look upon the EU as a model of regulatory
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integration and it is significant to the extent we might look to it as another source of
imports.
The EU is not, of course, a fixed limited entity. The population of member
states has grown since the inception of the Union; new member states have been
admitted recently; and the Union may well expand further in the near future.173 In
addition, the most recent EU medicines legislation has not yet been fully
implemented by all member states and newer member states have yet to assimilate
fully their regulatory schemes.174 What is more, if we take seriously the notion that
real regulatory equivalence depends on equivalence across levels of
implementation—beginning with a statutory and code framework, but running
through fine institutional structures and competencies, compliance resources, etc.—
then we must recognize that the promise of integration is, at least in the near term,
limited to a certain degree of high-level policy coordination. The likelihood that
medicines regulation will soon mean the same thing—on the ground—from Britain,
through Greece, to Turkey seems slight, to say the least.
Regulatory difference across the union explains a certain lack of uniformity—
and indeed a certain degree of strategic game playing—in the approval of medicines
in Europe.175 New pharmaceutical medicines in the EU may take one of two
principal approval pathways—that of the centralized approval procedure or that of
the mutual recognition procedure.176 Under centralized approval, application is
made to the EMEA itself and approval for marketing, once granted, is valid in all
member states.177 Under mutual recognition, on the other hand, a manufacturer
submits its product to the scrutiny of an individual member state’s authorizing
authority and then seeks, through the EMEA, the extension of marketing authority to
one or more additional member states.178 In the event that a named member state
declines to recognize the approval in question, the EMEA plays the role of
arbitrator.179
Most new drugs now receive authorization via the centralized procedure.180
Centralized approval does several things, but it does not erase heterogeneity of
regulatory scrutiny across the Union. It does not, for example, impose quite the
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same authorization strictures on all submissions.181 At least in certain regards, the
EMEA is not so much a full-fledged (or fully-staffed) regulatory agency, but a
coordinating agency for the diverse authorities of the various member states.182
Whereas, for example, U.S. applications for the authority to market new drugs
inevitably proceed through the FDA, which issues, for example, an investigational
new drug exemptions permitting the conduct of clinical trials and which oversees the
progress of those clinical trials, the EMEA farms out the lion’s share of its approval
oversight to the authorizing authorities of the individual member states.183 Thus, the
authorizing authorities of individual member states stand in the shoes of the
EMEA.184 That results in several loci of strategizing. First, manufacturers may
prefer to seek the regulatory scrutiny of one agency rather than another. Second, just
as U.S. regulation depends, in part, on fees generated by applications themselves, so
too, does European regulation.185 As a consequence, certain agency problems may
be magnified under the European regulatory scheme and some have observed that
both the central authority and the authorities of the various member states are
interested parties whose interests may diverge when it comes to the question which
regulatory pathway a given new drug will face.186
Earlier, I presented familiar arguments as to why we ought to seek
administrative solutions to certain sorts of problems and why, for a sub-class of such
problems, we ought to seek solution via government administration. I noted that
such arguments were not developed without a degree of caution, as administrative
solutions posed their own agency problems and as government administration posed
further problems still. All such problems impose costs on any organizational
endeavor. With regard to any particular administrative problem (or class of
problems), attention then turns to the means of minimizing such costs. What should
not be supposed, without examination, is that any particular administrative solution
is efficient or even functional.
The impetus towards regulatory harmonization is plain enough. Technical and
institutional expertise may be pooled, reducing certain total and average
administrative costs, while at the same time reducing development, manufacturing,
marketing, and distribution costs for manufacturers of products that are intended for
global markets. At the margin, we should expect price to be reduced and supply
increased, and at least some pharmaceutical products may exist at that margin.
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Hence we observe not just the European integration program, but, for example, the
considerable progress of the International Conference on Harmonization.187
At the same time, we cannot help but notice that international administration
amplifies certain familiar agency costs and creates, perhaps, its own distinctive ones.
Monitoring costs, for example, are liable to increase with the scale of the regulatory
endeavor. They are also liable to increase as administration ranges over increasingly
diverse populations and is implemented through increasingly diverse regulatory
mechanisms and systems. What I want to suggest regarding a proto-integrated
Europe is this: the extent to which the harmonization of regulatory requirements and
the centralization of administrative authority are truly practicable remains to be seen.
The particular architecture of European drug regulation is, at least in some
regards, at odds with the commitment to open trade based on common regulatory
standards.188 That suggests, at the very least, that we be wary of parallel trade in
pharmaceuticals with the Union as a whole. And to the extent that parallel trade
within the EU is preserved, it suggests that we be wary of parallel trade with any
particular member state, even as certain of those states have well established and
familiar medicines regulation. Parallel trade with the United Kingdom, for example,
would pose many of the same concerns raised by proposals for parallel trade with
Canada, and then some; the considerable resources of the Medicines and Healthcare
Products Regulatory Agency notwithstanding.
Establishing administrative
coordination with Britain imposes one set of costs, and uncertainties about our
ability to cabin that coordination, against issues raised elsewhere in Europe, another.
The following generality may be observed: expanding the network of parallel trade
partners may expand the benefits of price competition; but expanding the network is
liable, at the same time, to amplify the market’s natural risks and the administrative
costs of managing them.
In the meantime, we have a vibrant laboratory for our general questions about
balancing open markets and regulatory concerns for drugs, a laboratory we may
prefer to the motley of hastily conceived and implemented parallel-trade programs
seen in many U.S. states. Experimentation in the states does not, after all, need to be
experimentation in our states. As with all experimentation, the demonstration lies in
the data—yet to be developed—but the worth of the demonstration lies centrally in
the controls. We must remember all the relevant variables in our price, property,
trade, and health problem. There are, as I hope to have shown, quite a few.
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The International Conference on Harmonization of Technical Requirements for Registration
of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use (ICH) is an ongoing public/private conference between regulatory
agencies and pharmaceutical trade associations in the U.S., the E.U., and Japan. ICH projects include,
the Common Technical Document (regarding a standard format for the submission of drug safety and
efficacy information) and the Medical Dictionary for Regulatory Activities (MedRA). ICH documents
and other information may be found at Welcome to The Official Website for ICH,
http://www.ich.org/cache/compo/276-254-1.html (last visited April 5, 2006). For an overview of
recent FDA-ICH activity, see FDA’s Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, International
Activities, http://www.fda.gov/cder/audiences/iact/iachome.htm#ICH (last visited April 5, 2006).
188
See Garattini & Bertelé, supra note 175, at 86-87 (discussing conflicts between health and
industrial policy accentuated by institutional location of EMEA in European Commissions General
Directorate of Enterprises rather than the Public Health Directorate).

